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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of 
Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 
1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The juridical status of the Gulf of Aqaba (the Gulf) and the Strait of Tiran (the 
Strait) has been a subject of heated controversy between the Arab nations and 
Israel since the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948. 1 The only means by 
which ships may reach the Israeli port ofElath, located on the northern tip of the 
Gulf, is through the Gulf. Therefore, Israel needs navigational rights through 
the Gulf and the Strait for access to its port as well as to the Red Sea. Ships 
proceeding to or from Israel's port of Elath must cross into Egypt's territorial 
waters2 when passing through the Strait of Tiran, and into the territorial waters 
of either Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia when navigating through the Gulf. 
I. In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly declared the end of the Palestine Mandate as of August I, 
1948, and approved the partition of Palestine into aJewish state and an Arab state. Resolution Adopted 
on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 2 U.N. GAOR Res. at 131, U.N. 
Doc. N516 (1947). Murphy, To Bring To An End the State of War: The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. 12 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 897, 901 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Murphy]. For a brief summary of the 
events leading to the termination of the Palestine Mandate, see id. at 899-902. See also Reich, Silverburg 
& Stein, The Middk East Process: Sisyphus Reexamined, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 17 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Reich, Silverburg & Stein]. 
2. The term "territorial waters" refers to that bank of waters off the coastline of a state over which the 
state may exercise sovereignty. Although a state may regulate activity in its territorial waters, it must 
accord to foreign vessels the right of innocent passage. LAPlDoTH, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
LAPIDOTH]. Innocent passage is a concept which has had various definitions. The notion of innocent 
passage embodies a balancing of coastal and maritime states' interests. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, 
THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 184-87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE]. The 
coastal states have a legitimate interest in using their territorial waters as a buffer zone to protect against 
attack, as well as an interest in protecting their fishing grounds and natural resources. The concern of 
the maritime states is that restrictive use of territorial waters may impede their ability to use the oceans 
for transportation and communication. Id. at 174-79. As nations have increasingly relied on the use of 
oceans for transport, the concept of innocent passage has changed to accommodate the concerns of 
maritime and coastal states that their interests be protected. For a more detailed discussion of the 
changing definition of innocent passage, see notes 95-96 infra and accompanying text. See also discussion 
§ I1l.B & § IV.A infra. 
As part of the effort to provide a satisfactory definition of innocent passage, the nations of the world 
have also attempted, for several decades, to decide upon an acceptable mile limit for the width of the 
territorial sea. The controversy over the width of the territorial sea is discussed at note 31 infra and 
accompanying text; text accompanying notes 176-188 infra; note 239 infra and accompanying text; text 
accompanying notes 254-255 infra. 
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Israel relies on unrestricted access to the waterways for trade as well as for 
protection of its own security interests.3 
Israel, therefore, has argued consistently for the most lenient characterization, 
under international law, of both waterways, in order to ensure the freedom of 
navigation necessary to protect its economic and political interests. 4 Conversely, 
the Arab nations bordering the Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran5 have histori-
cally resisted Israel's characterization of these waters as international,s asserting 
Arab sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba. 7 This claim of sovereignty, if legiti-
mate, would allow those Arab nations to regulate passage of ships at will. s The 
Arab states claimed that the combination of the asserted territorial nature of the 
3. "The importance of reliable communications to the mainten~mce of world peace and security has 
been clearly demonstrated by the events in the Middle East. ... The Egyptians have denied the right of 
Israeli shipping or of ships with cargoes bound to or from Israel to pass through the Straits of Tiran and 
the Suez Canal on the grounds that a state of war continues to exist between Egypt and Israel. This has 
been a source of controversy and conflict." Grandison & Meyer, International Straits, Global Communica-
tions, and the Ewlving Law of the Sea, 8 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 425 n.96 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Grandison & Meyer]. Bloomfield states that the likelihood of armed conflict in the Gulf area would be 
greatly increased were Israel not assured of permanent freedom of navigation in the Gulf. L. BLOOM-
FIELD, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE GULF OF AQABA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 
BLOOMFIELD]. The commercial importance of the Gulf of Aqaba increased as the Suez Canal became too 
congested to accommodate the large amount of oil transport traffic. Id. at 79. In addition, the Gulf can 
accomodate a greater amount of traffic than can the Suez Canal, being physically less constricted than 
the Canal. Id. 
Grandison and Meyer discuss the political and economic consequences of restrictions on passage 
through straits in particular. They assert that curtailment of free straits passage will affect the world 
economy, through increases in freight rates and consequent increases in the price of commodities and 
mineral resources, as well as national strategic interests, through impairing the movement of military 
aircraft and navies. Grandison & Meyer. supra, at 412-19. O'Connell also comments on the importance 
of free passage through straits, from the viewpoint of the naval powers: "The legal status of the 
principal avenues of access between the world's seas is ... an intrinsic element in the global balance of 
deterrence, in the maintenance of equilibrium in the Middle East and in the retention of the ability to 
intervene decisively when national interests dictate the deployment of sea power." D. O'CONNELL, THE 
INFLUENCE OF LAw ON SEA POWER 98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL]. 
4. See generally Gross, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage 
Through the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 564, 566 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Gross]; Statement of 
Israeli Delegate Mrs. Meir, 11 U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1275-76, U.N. Doc. AlPV. 666 (1957). 
5. Those nations are Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
6. The term "international waters" has no precise legal meaning in international law. LAPIDOTH, 
supra note 2, at 9. Although many delegates present at the eleventh session of the General Assembly 
stated that the Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran were "international waterways," they failed to provide 
specific legal criteria for this characterization that would distinguish an "international waterway" from 
waterways that are normally associated with more restrictive passage regimes. See § II.B.3 infra. 
7. See generally LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 56-61; Selak, A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of 
Aqaba, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 660, 676-81 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Selak]; Question considered by the 
First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956, Memorandum 
Registering the Saudi Arabian Government's Legal and Historical Rights in the Straits of Tiran and the 
Gulf of Aqaba, 11 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 77 (mimeograph), U.N. Doc. Al3575 
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. 
8. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 29-30. 
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Strait of Tiran9 and the national or historic status of the Gulf entitled them to 
monitor closely passage of ships through the Strait, as well. lo 
Additionally, the Arab nations claimed to be in a continuing state of war with 
Israel. ll This claim bolstered their argument that navigation through the dis-
puted area was legitimately regulable by the Arab states l2 in spite of Israeli 
protest. Until recently, none of the three Arab littoral states had demonstrated a 
willingness to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. 13 With the signing of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979,14 Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat 
effectively acknowledged the termination of hostilities between Egypt and Is-
rael,15 thereby relinquishing the Egyptian government's claim to regulate navi-
9. Because of the geographical characteristics of the Strait. only one channel is practicably navigable. 
Selak. supra note 7, at 660. Assuming that Egypt legally owns the Sinai Peninsula, LAPIDOTH, supra note 
2, at 53 n.146, this channel. located less than a mile from the Sinai Peninsula, is clearly part of Egypt's 
territorial waters. Merani & Sterling. Legal Consideration of the Israeli-Egyptian Dispute Involving the Right of 
Innocent Passage Through the StraitsofTiran, II IND.]. INT'L L. 411, 416 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Merani 
& Sterling]. 
10. LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 56. 
II. See Letter of Mohammed Mahmoud Mahgoub, Commissioner General of the Arab Boycott of 
Israel. August 31, 1975, to National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVEl<-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMM. 94TH CONG., 2D SES$., 
REPORT ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 86 (Subcomm. Print 1976). 
12. The ability of one nation to regulate passage through straits and territorial waters is, inter alia, 
dependent on whether the nation is at war. During times of peace, a nation must abide by the rules of 
custom or treaties, which generally restrict a nation's authority to suspend passage in its territorial 
waters. However, during times of war, a nation has greater leeway to suspend passage of ships through 
its waterways, especially if that nation is itself an active belligerent. Cj I C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND ApPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 518 (2d ed. 1947) (" [A] State enjoys the 
right to prevent as well as regulate the passage through the marginal sea of a belligerent ship .... The 
right of so-called innocent passage vanishes whenever the conduct of a ship is harmful to the territorial 
sovereign.") [hereinafter cited as HYDE]. Although authorities do not agree on the extent to which a 
state of war changes peacetime rules of international law, one accepted theory is that the overriding 
security interest of a belligerent nation justifies the wilful suspension of foreign shipping. For a 
discussion of regulation of passage through international waterways in time of war and peace, see 
generally Baxter, Passage of Ships Through International Waters in Time of War, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187, 
192-208 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Baxter]. 
13. Serious Arab-Israeli conflict began with the competing demands for Palestine at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The Jews sought to establish a homeland in Palestine, while the Arabs sought to 
establish independent states in that area. During the 1920s and 1930s, in response to the Balfour 
Declaration which the Jews interpreted as favoring a Jewish national homeland, fighting broke out in 
Palestine. The hostility continued throughout the 1940s, even after Israel attained statehood. Both 
Israel and the Arab nations initiated fighting after 1948. Egypt blocked passage through the Suez Canal, 
and several years later, Israel launched an attack in the Sinai. For general background, see Murphy, 
surpa note I, at 899-907. See also D. BEN-GURION, ISRAEL: YEARS OF CHALLENGE (1963); R. DEVORE, THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1976); THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: READINGS O. Moore ed. 1974). 
14. Treaty of Peace, March 26,1979, Egypt-Israel, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 362 (1979) [hereinafter cited 
as Treaty of Peace]. 
15. International law recognizes that the signing of a Peace Treaty formally ends a state of war 
between the signatories. Oppenheim states that "unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the effect of a 
treaty of peace is that conditions remain as at the conclusion of peace" and "a treaty of peace is 
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gation as a belligerentI6 and ending the Arab states' solidarity on the issue. 
However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which did not participate in the negotiations 
leading to the signing of the Treaty!7 evidenced no desire to change the position 
to which they had adhered prior to the Treaty's ratification. 
This Comment traces the development of the problematic characterization of 
the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, from customary international law to 
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The author concentrates on how the changing 
characterization affected the evolution of navigation regimesI8 for these water-
ways through the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone,I9 the proposed United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty,20 and finally the 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israe1.21 The discussion focuses, in conclu-
sion, on the rights and duties of the signatories to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty, and potential problems raised by the fact that Jordan and Saudi Arabia, 
considered a final settlement of war." 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 611 (H. umterpacnt ed. 7th 
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as 2 OPPENHEIM]. 
16. The signing of the Peace Treaty formally ended the state of war between Egypt and Israel, 
according to international law. /d. Therefore, the argument that Egypt could regulate passage through 
the waters as a belligerent was no longer supportable under general international law principles. For a 
full discussion, see § II.A.3 infra. Egypt also gave up any claim to the waters as national waters by 
recognizing that the Gulf and Strait were international waterways. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. V. 
17. U.S. President Jimmy Carter, while in the Middle East early in January 1978, was unable to 
persuade other Arab nations to participate with Egypt in negotiations for peace. Reich, Silverburg & 
Stein, supra note 1, at 31. After the parties concluded the Framework for Peace, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance again attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to garner the support of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Id. at 
39. 
The Arab nations reacted unfavorably to the signing of the Treaty of Peace, and whether Saudi 
Arabia or Jordan can be convinced in the near future to participate in further peace negotiations is 
questionable. Aviel, Ecorwmic Implications of the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 12 CASE W. REs. J. 
INT'L L. 57, 61-62, 70 (1980). 
18. The author has limited the scope of this Comment to the laws that regulate the passage of 
commercial vessels in times of peace. During a state of war, a belligerent nation may deny passage to 
foreign ships without violating peacetime laws for regulation of maritime passage. See HYDE, supra note 
12, at 518. The Arab nations attempted to justify impediment to Israeli shipping, arguing that a state of 
war existed between the nations. See § II.A.3 infra. However, although authorities express different 
opinions on the effect of an Armistice Agreement, this Comment assumes that the Egyptian.Israeli 
General Armistice Agreement of 1949 ended a state of belligerency at least between the parties, and 
that, therefore, the parties were bound to respect peacetime law. See notes 78-89 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
In general, the passage regime for warships through straits is similar to the passage regime for 
merchant ships. However, the fact that warships are equipped to perform belligerent acts may enable 
the coastal state to more closely regulate warship passage through those waters. For a discussion of the 
passage of warships through straits in times of peace and in times of war, see Baxter, supra note 12. For a 
discussion of the law regarding passage of warships through territorial waters outside of straits, see 
McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 216-26. 
19. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea]. 
20. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. NCONF.621WP.10/Rev. 3 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS Draft Convention]. 
21. Treaty of Peace, sup--a note 14. 
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which did not sign the Peace Treaty, will be bound by a different scheme, 
embodied in either the 1958 Convention or the proposed Law of the Sea Treaty. 
II. THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAIT OF TIRAN PRIOR TO THE 1958 
TERRITORIAL SEA CONVENTION 
A. The Gulf of Aqaba 
The Gulf of Aqaba, bordered by the states of Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, is approximately 100 miles in length. Its width varies from three miles at 
the narrowest point to seventeen miles at the widest point.22 The only navigable 
entrance to the Gulf is the Strait of Tiran, which is located at the southern tip of 
the Gulf, between Tiran Island and the Sinai Peninsula. Two ports - Elath 
(Israel) and Aqaba Oordan) - are located at the northern tip of the Gulf. 
Several incidents of Arab hostility toward Israel in the Gulf and in the Suez 
Canal during the 1950s23 prompted a debate between Israel and the Arab states 
over the legal status of, and passage regime in, the Gulf of Aqaba.24 The major 
forums for the presentation of Israeli and Arab views were the Security Council 
in 1954,25 the International Law Commission in 1956,26 and the U.N. General 
22. Selak. supra note 7, at 660. Kennedy states that the breadth of the Gulf at its widest point is 14Y2 
miles. A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical Study of Bays and Estuaries. the Coasts of Which 
Belong to Different States, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. U.N. Doc. NCONF.13/15 
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy]. The two and a half mile difference is not of critical importance 
in the context of the discussion which follows later in this Comment. 
23. Over the course of several years, the Egyptian government persisted in impeding the passage of 
ships bound for the Israeli port of Elath. The Egyptians denied access to a British ship in 1951, and 
fired upon Danish, Greek, American. Italian and British ships in 1953. 1954 and 1955. BLOOMFIELD. 
supra note 3. at 11-12. From 1955 to 1958, as part of its blockade against Israel, the Egyptian 
government insisted that vessels bound for the Gulf of Aqaba secure a permit in anticipation of entering 
the Gulf. Merani & Sterling. supra note 9. at 414. 
24. Gross. supra note 4. at 564. 
25. [d. 
In 1951, after learning that Egypt was restricting movement of Israeli bound ships through the Suez 
Canal, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution calling upon Egypt to curtail what it considered to 
be acts of aggression, in contravention of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949. Resolution 
on the Palestine Question Adopted at the 558th Meeting of the Security Council on 1 September 1951, 6 
U.N. SCOR (558th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/2322 (1951). In spite of the resolution, Egypt continued to 
restrict movement of ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1954, the Israeli 
government raised the problem of Egypt's belligerent acts before the Security Council. Letter dated 28 
January 1954 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council, 9 U.N. SCOR 
Supp. Oan.-Mar. 1954) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/3168 (1954). It urged the Security Council to act with 
reference to what the Israeli government considered a violation of the Security Council Resolution of 
September 1, 1951, the Egyptian- Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 1949, and international law 
(freedom of navigation). [d. at 1-3; BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 41-47. 
26. Gross, supra note 4, at 564. In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly established the International 
Law Commission. C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 22 (6th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as 
COLOMBOS]. The purpose of the Commission was to study various problems of international law and, 
based on its study, recommend specific areas of international law that should be codified. [d. For 
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Assembly in 1956-57.21 Throughout the 1950s, the Arab nations presented 
several arguments to support their legal right to regulate passage of ships 
through the Gulf, including: the theory of the Gulf as internal waters; the 
historic nature of the bay; and the existence of a state of war with Israel. Israel, 
with the support of other major world powers, countered that the Arab claims 
were not legally supportable, asserting a superior right to enjoy unimpeded 
access to the Gulf. 
1. The Gulf of Aqaba as Internal Waters 
Under customary international law,28 a body of water with the geography of 
the Gulf of Aqaba is non-territorial. 29 International law recognizes a gulf bor-
dered by more than one littoral state as being part of the high seas.30 With the 
information on the International Law Commission, see generally H. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw 
COMMISSION (1965). 
One of the studies which the Commission undertook involved the law of the high seas and territorial 
waters. COLOMBOS, supra, at 22. Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 899 (IX), the Commission 
prepared, after eight sessions, a final report on the Law of the Sea. Report of the International Law 
Commission Covering the Work of its Eighth Session, 23 April-4July 1956, II U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
9) at I, U.N. Doc. Al3159 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Report of the l.L.C., Eighth Session I. The 
Commission finalized its study in proposed articles concerning the law of the sea. The 1958 Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea used the Commission's Draft Articles as its negotiating text. Slonim, The 
Right of Innocent Passage and the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 96, 98 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Slonim]. 
27. Gross, supra note 4, at 564. In the fall of 1956, the Israeli government attacked Egyptian troops 
located in the Sinai Peninsula. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 144. Within one week, Israel had gained 
control of the Sinai and the Gulfof Aqaba, and had ended the blockade ofElath.Id. at 148. Although by 
late January 1957 Israel had withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula pursuant to United Nations Resolu-
tions calling for the withdrawal, the Israelis still retained control of the Sharm-el-Sheikh area of the Sinai. Id. 
at 151. In February of 1957, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for complete Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai. G.A. Res. 1124 (XI), II U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 76, U.N. 
Doc. AlRESl460 (1957); G.A. Res. 1125 (XI), II U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 76, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/461 (1957); BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 151. At the eleventh session of the General Assembly, 
the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Golda Meir, announced that Israel was prepared to withdraw 
completely from the Sinai Peninsula, on the condition that Egypt refrain from its acts of aggression in 
the Gulf of Aqaba, which the Israeli government considered an international waterway open to free and 
innocent passage. See II U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1275, para. I; 1276, para. II, U.N. Doc. 
AlPV.666 (1957). 
28. For purposes of this Comment, the term "customary international law" or "custom" refers to the 
body of international law that is not yet codified in treaty form. For a discussion of customary 
international law, see generally A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as D'AMATO]. 
29. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 508 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as 
I OPPENHEIM]' The term "non-territorial" in this Comment refers to those waters which are not subject 
to the claims of any nation. These seas are open seas, or high seas. The term has significance in 
international law when used to define the extent to which a state can regulate the passage of foreign 
ships, i.e., the coastal state has no authority to restrict the passage of ships through seas outside of its 
territorial waters. COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 47. 
30. I OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 508. The open sea is beyond the territorial competence of any 
state. COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 47. 
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exception of the territorial seas claimed legitimately by the bordering states,31 
such part of the high seas is "in time of peace and war open to vessels of all 
nations, including men-of-war."32 
However, authorities recognize that under customary international law, a state 
whose borders surround a bay may claim complete sovereignty to the bay by 
asserting that the waters enclosed by its borders are internal waters.33 Under 
international law, internal waters are normally those areas of water that are 
immediately adjacent to a nation's coastlines.34 International law allows a single 
nation to claim a bay as its internal waters if the nation's borders totally encom-
pass the water claimed, and if the nation's borders surround the entrance to 
those waters from an area of high seas.35 A nation's legitimate claims to internal 
waters enables it to arbitrarily deny access to foreign ships.36 No set criteria for 
denial of passage are adhered to by nations. 37 
Thus, one of the Arab nations' major justifications for interfering with ship-
ping in the Gulf was that the Gulf constituted internal waters, which the Arabs 
could, therefore, freely regulate.3s However, under customary international law, 
the Arab claim was not well-founded. The case of a bay surrounded by one state 
is distinguishable from that of a bay bordered by more than one nation.39 In the 
latter instance, the enclosed waters do not constitute internal waters. 40 The 
Arabs attempted to overcome this distinction by arguing that all three littoral 
states came under one Arab nation. However, the fact that the peoples of the 
31. Notwithstanding the principle of the freedom of the seas, there are certain portions of the sea 
along a State's coasts which are universally considered as a prolongation of its territory and 
over which its jurisdiction is recognized .... Territorial waters are those included within a 
definite maritime zone or belt adjacent to a State's territory. 
COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 87. Most states claimed a maximum breadth of three miles as the legal 
limit of the territorial sea. However, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia claimed six miles of territorial sea in 
the Gulf, and subsequently revised their claims to encompass an additional six miles each, thereby 
enlarging the breadth of their territorial seas to 12 miles. Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in 
the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 141 (1968); LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 55; Alexander, 
Indices of National Interest in the Oceans, I OCEAN DEV. & INT'L LJ. 21, 44-45 (1973). 
32. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 508-09. 
33. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 92-93. 
34. Id. at 89. The authors note that ports and "indentations of the coastline" are examples of internal 
waters.Id. 
35. Commentary (2) to Draft Article 26, Report of the 1.L.c., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 23-24; 
LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 21. 
36. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 73, 93, 305. 
37. See id. at 155-57. 
38. Statement of Saudi Arabian delegate Mr. Shukairy, 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg.) at 233, 
para. 92, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 697 (1957). 
39. COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 191-92. 
40. See id. Colombos states that gulfs which are bordered by more than one nation cannot be claimed 
as internal seas. Rather, each state may assert sovereignty over its territorial waters. The rule applies 
with respect to land-locked gulfs and to gulfs, surrounded by more than one state, which have an 
entrance to the high seas. Id.; LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 57. 
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three littoral Arab nations are all Muslims does not give single nation sfatus to a 
group of three independent states.41 Thus, they could not claim the single nation 
exception to characterize the Gulf as internal waters. 
2. The Gulf of Aqaba as Historic Waters 
The Arab nations posed an alternative argument to the internal waters con-
cept: Even if the Gulf could not be defined as internal waters, because of the 
presence of more than one littoral state, the same result of total Arab sovereignty 
could be achieved if the Gulf were classified as a historic bay.42 International law 
recognizes the historic character of a bay when the nations of the world acquiesce 
in the claimant nation's exclusive use of a body of water over a long period of 
time.43 
The Arab nations seized upon this exception to justify the denial of free 
passage by Israel through the Gulf.44 The Saudi Arabian government justified 
Arab aggression in the Gulf area45 toward ships trading with Israel by arguing 
that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted national, historic waters, having been under 
Arab domination for centuries.46 Saudi Arabia thus attempted to reject any 
41. LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 57. 
42. Gross, supra note 4, at 566-67; LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 58. 
Some claims to comprehensive authority over ... [bays and gulfs] ... rest not on any 
contention about the relative width or depth of the area enclosed but on historical title. Some 
bays have been asserted to be a part of internal waters, irrespective of the width of the 
entrance, on the ground that the coastal state has always so regarded such areas and other 
states have acquiesced in the claim. 
JESSUP, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 383-437 (1927), cited in 
McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 312. As "historic" waters, the Arab nations could regulate passage 
as completely as they might had their claim under the internal waters theory been successful. 
43. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays, prepared by the Secretariat, United 
Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1962), vol. 2,cited in COLOMBos,supra note 26, 
at 181. 
44. See note 42 supra. 
45. See BLOOMFlELD, supra note 3, at 11-12; see MERANI & STERUNG, supra note 9, at 414. 
46. In a letter of April 12, 1957 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Saudi Arabian 
permanent representative Abdullah AI-Khayyal set forth the claims of Saudi Arabia to the Gulf as 
historic, territorial waters. 
The whole width ofthe Gulf entrance does not exceed 9 miles, which is 12 miles shorter than in 
those gulfs treated by international law as international waterways .... Furthermore, the 
territorial character of the Gulf, its waters, entrance and straits, was affirmed by the Treaty of 
Constantinople of 1888 concerning the Suez Canal .... The records of the negotiations leading 
to the said Treaty clearly reveal that the Gulf of Aqaba and its straits were intended to be 
excluded from the proposed freedom of international navigation in the Suez Canal, thus 
acknowledging that the waters of the Gulf, its entrance and straits, are territorial and implying 
no freedom of international navigation through them. 
On the basis of the status quo, as well as on the principles of law, the Gulf of Aqaba cannot, 
therefore, be considered an open waterway. 
Memorandum, supra note 7, at 4. Gross finds this assertion to have no basis, and finds that any argument 
that could·he based on the Suez Canal Convention would he supportive offreedom of navigation. Gross, 
supra note 4, at 567-68. 
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possibility that the Gulf could be considered an international waterway. The 
Saudi representative to the U.N. General Assembly, Ahmad Shukairy, in a 
statement made during the twelfth session of the General Assembly,47 argued 
that the Gulf of Aqaba, being a national inland waterway, was not governed by 
the normal international rules for passage of ships through bays and gulfs. 
The basis for the Saudi Arabian characterization of the Gulf as mare clausum48 
is the Fonseca case, decided in 1917.49 The Fonsl1ca case arose out of a controversy 
between the Republic of El Salvador and the Republic of Nicaragua. The gov-
ernment of Nicaragua had entered into the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with the 
United States.50 Nicaragua, by one of the provisions of the Treaty, granted a 
portion of the Gulf of Fonseca to the United States for the establishment of a 
naval base.51 El Salvador complained that the Treaty violated, in this respect, its 
rights of common ownership in the Gulf of Fonseca.52 
The Salvadorian argument was premised on the contention that El Salvador, 
along with Honduras and Nicaragua, was one of the three joint owners of the 
Gulf of Fonseca. In support of the common ownership theory, El Salvador 
argued that, from the time of the discovery of the Gulf of Fonseca in the 
sixteenth century, Spain had exercised complete sovereignty over the water.53 
Spain's sovereign rights passed to the Federal Republic of Central America when 
the republics were emancipated.54 El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua were 
the only three republics that used the water for fishing and other purposes.55 
During the twelfth session of the General Assembly that year. the Saudi Arabian government asserted 
that the Gulf was an historic gulf: 
[TJhe Gulf of Aqaba is of the category of historical gulfs that fall outside the sphere of 
international law. The Gulf is the historical route to the holy places in Mecca. Pilgrims from 
different Muslim countries have been streaming through the Gulf. year after year. for four-
teen centuries. Ever since. the Gulf has been an exclusively Arab route under Arab 
sovereignty. It is due to this undisputed fact that not a single international authority makes any 
mention whatsoever of the Gulf as an international waterway open for international naviga-
tion. 
Statement of Saudi Arabian delegate Mr. Shukairy. 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg.) at 233. para. 93. 
U.N. Doc. AiPV.697 (1957). See also Selak. sufrra note 7. at 679-80. But see LAPIDOTH. sufrra note 2. at 
58-61. Lapidoth disagrees and asserts that the argument has no substantive support in international law. 
Id. at 59-61. 
47. Statement of Saudi Arabian delegate Mr. Shukairy. 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg.) at 233. 
para. 93. U.N. Doc. A/Pv.697 (1957). 
48. Mare clausum. in international law. refers to closed seas. See 1. BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 238 (3d ed. 1979). 
49. The Republic of EI Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua. 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (Cent. Am. Ct. 
Just. 1917). The Gulf of Fonseca is bounded by the territories of Nicaragua. Honduras and EI Salvador. 
The entrance. which is located between the mainland of EI Salvador and the coast of Nicaragua. is less 
than ten miles in breadth. Id. at 678-80. 
50. Id. at 674. 
51. Id. at 675. 
52. Id. at 677. 
53. Id. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
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and, therefore, when the federation was dissolved, the three littoral states con-
tinued to own the waters in common. 56 
The Central American Court of Justice unanimously affirmed the argument 
of El Salvador and found that the Gulf was a historic bay having the characteris-
tics of a closed sea.57 The Court based its decision on several factors. First, El 
Salvador had demonstrated "immemorial" possession by establishing exclusive 
ownership by Spain and its successors.58 Second, other nations had acquiesced in 
this peaceful and continuous ownership.59 Third, the Court found that the 
strategic location of the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific coast of Central America 
was of paramount importance for the defense of the three countries.60 In 
addition, because of its geographical location, the nations relied on access to the 
Gulf of Fonseca for trade.6! Thus, the Court stated that it was an "indispensable 
necessity that those States should possess the Gulf as fully as required by those 
primordial interests and the interest of national defense."62 
Arguably, the Gulf of Aqaba could be analogized, at least geographically, to 
the Gulf of Fonseca, and, thus, could be considered in the class of such "historic" 
gulfs.63 However, while the geography of the Gulf of Fonseca is similar to that of 
the Gulf of Aqaba,64 the weight of authority tends to disregard the validity of 
Saudi Arabia's claims.65 Although Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan may be 
successors of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the Gulf from 1517 to 1918, 
the Ottoman Empire evidenced no peaceful and continuous possession of the 
Gulf.66 Historical data refute any suggestion that the littoral states used the Gulf 
to the exclusion of other nations. 67 In fact, the data demonstrate that, because of 
the Gulf's geographical and natural constraints, those states were precluded 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at 693. 
58. Id. at 700. 
59. Id. at 70 I. 
60. [d. at 705. 
61. Id. at 704-05. 
62. Id. at 705. 
63. Hammad, The Right of Passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, 15 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 118, 131-32 (1959). 
64. Selak, supra note 7, at 692. 
65. Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 
127 (1968). See also Melamid, Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 412-13 (1959) 
[hereinafter cited as Melamid]. Melamid states that there has been an "absence of any defined 
sovereignty in the Gulf' and that "[r]esearch supports the view that navigation rights have definitely 
been established in the Gulf of Aqaba by nations other than the Arab States." !d. at 413. 
66. See note 65 supra. 
67. Melamid, supra note 65, at 413. For example, until 1950, few Arab ships had passed through the 
Gulf. On the other hand, in 1917 the British government began to supply its troops by use of the Gulf. 
[d. at 412-13. 
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from relying to any extent on regular use of the Gulf for commercial ventures.68 
Furthermore, nations have not universally acquiesced in the notion of the Gulf 
as historic inland waters.69 
Although the criteria of the Fonseca decision were not met with respect to the 
Gulf of Aqaba, international law may uphold an agreement among bordering 
gulf states to characterize a gulf as a closed sea.70 However, no known agreement 
to this effect was ever reached by the Arab states,71 and the presence of Israel on 
the Gulf precludes, in the historical context of Arab-Israeli conflict, the possibil-
ity of a four-nation agreement.72 
68. Because of the strong northerly winds, passage through the Gulf was extremely difficult until the 
invention of steam navigation. The British were the first, in 1917, to use steam navigation in the Gulf. 
Melamid, supra note 65, at 412. 
69. Gross, supra note 4, at 570; LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 60. 
70. See News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, February 19, 1957, U.S. Policy in 
the Middle East, 36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 400 (1957). Dulles stated that "[i]fthe four littoral states which have 
boundaries upon the Gulf should all agree that it should be closed, then it could be closed." [d. at 404. 
Hyde has also stated that: 
[w ]hen the geographical relationship of a bay to the adjacent or enveloping land is such that 
the sovereign of the latter, if a single State, might not unlawfully claim the waters as a part of its 
territory, it is not apparent why a like privilege should be denied to two or more States to which 
such land belongs, at least if they are so agreed. 
HYDE, supra note 12, at 475. 
71. Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 423-24 n.30. 
72. But see ill. at 423. Merani and Sterling assert that Israel's presence on the Gulf may be illegitimate. 
If so, international practice may accord the mare clausum argument greater weight. One of Saudi 
Arabia's principal assertions was that Israel's presence on the Gulf was illegal. See Statement of Saudi 
Arabian delegate Mr. Shukairy, 12 U.N. GAOR (697th plen. mtg.) at 233, paras. 95-96, U.N. Doc. 
A/PV.697 (1957). Authorities have expressed different views on the subject. 
After the General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine, thereby allowing Israel to establish 
itself as a nation, Israel advanced to the southern Negev and acquired the area of Bir Qattar. Jordan 
had controlled that part of the Negev, in which Elath was located, until the Israelis advanced into the 
area in 1949. Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 420. Although the U.N. partition resolution allocated 
that land to Israel, Israel's advance into the Negev occurred after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli 
Armistice Agreement of 1949, which provided that neither party was to advance militarily beyond the 
positions held at the time the Agreement was signed. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, 4 
U.N. SCOR Supp. (Spec. Supp. 3) art. IV, at I, U.N. Doc. S/I2641Corr. 1 (1949) [hereinafter 
cited as General Armistice Agreement]; Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 421. Since Israel was not in 
possession of that territory prior to signing the Armistice Agreement, one argument was that its military 
occupation of the southern Negev was violative of the Agreement and thus illegal. Merani & Sterling, 
supra note 9, at 421. But see LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 64-65. Lapidoth states that the Armistice 
Agreement had no relevance to Israel's advance into the Negev, because only Jordan had troops located 
in the area. See also Selak, supra note 7, at 680. 
Some writers argue that Israel's presence on the Gulf is illegal since military occupation of a 
belligerent will not establish, under international law, legal sovereignty to territory. Merani & Sterling, 
supra note 9, at 422-23. Wright states that the "boundaries of Israel remain undetermined." Wright, 
Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 17 (1968). Expressing the 
contrary view, Lapidoth states that the argument of 
lack of sovereignty ... loses its relevance by the fact that ... the coast of Eilat does not differ 
from any other part of Israel's territory. Despite the long refusal of the Arab States to conclude 
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Finally, the Arab nations, by their own conduct, have undermined the claim 
that the Gulf qualifies as an historic bay. All three Arab nations have claimed a 
limit of territorial sea. This claim is further evidence that the Arab nations 
themselves regard the Gulf as part of the high seas, rather than as part of the 
closed seas subject to their varying claims of territorial waters. 73 
Thus, the Saudi Arabian position, based on international legal standards, was 
weak. The Gulf was, under international legal concepts, part of the high seas, 
open to all nations for free passage in time of peace or war. 74 
3. Claim of a State of Belligerency 
One additional problem arose in connection with passage of ships through the 
Gulf. The Arab nations, as an alternative to the Saudi Arabian mare clausum 
argument, contested Israel's right to navigate through their territorial waters on 
the grounds that a state of war still existed between Israel and the Arab nations. 70 
When Israel urged the Security Council in 1954 to condemn Egypt's aggression 
in the Gulf,16 the Egyptian government asserted that because of a continuing 
state of war between Egypt and Israel, Egypt was entitled to take measures to 
prevent the passage of belligerent ships.77 The Egyptian government argued 
that the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement78 had not legally ended 
the state of war between the two nations. 79 The Arabs renewed this argument 
during the eleventh session of the General Assembly.80 
peace treaties with Israel and to recognize it, it cannot be denied that Israel exists as a sovereign 
State, that it has been recognized by the great majority of States. 
LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 63-64. 
73. Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 
128 (1968). Israel also claims six miles of territorial sea. Alexander, Indices of National Interest in the 
Oceans, I OCEAN DEV. & I"T'L L.J. 21, 43 (1973). 
74. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra. 
75. LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 61-62; Selak, supra note 7, at 667-6R. 
76. Gross, supra note 4, at 564. 
77. Letter dated 28 January 1954 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security 
Council, 9 U.N. SCOR Supp. Uan.-Mar. 1954), at 4, U.N. Doc. S/3168 (1954); Gross, supra note 4, at 565 
n.7. 
78. General Armistice Agreement, supra note 72. The parties agreed, with a "view to promoting the 
return of permanent peace in Palestine," to refrain from use of military force in Palestine, to observe 
the armistice demarcation lines provided for in the Agreement and to withdraw forces from designated 
areas. Id. arts. 1-6. 
79. Mr. Azmi, representative of Egypt, quoted United States decisions and two international au-
thorities for the proposition that an armistice agreement does not end a state of war. He stated that "[a]n 
armistice is a provisional suspension of hostilities formally agreed upon between belligerents .... An 
Armistice, an agreement between belligerents, has never been considered as putting an end to a state of 
war or as creating a state of peace." 9 U.N. SCOR (661st mtg.) at 9-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.661 (1954). 
80. Cf 11 U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1278, para. 36; 1280, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 
(1957) (The United States delegation stated that once Israel had completed its withdrawal from the 
Sinai, there would be no basis for Egypt to assert belligerent rights, and the French delegate stated that 
none of the Gulf states could assert a state of war.). 
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Had the Arab nations successfully claimed an ongoing state of war with Israel, 
they would have had a legitimate legal basis to deny access to ships navigating 
toward the belligerent state of Israel. The rules of customary international law 
generally allow a littoral state to suspend passage of belligerent ships in order to 
protect itself.81 As one writer has stated, it would be "altogether unrealistic to 
suppose that a belligerent littoral State is required to allow passage to enemy 
warships and other vessels bent on hostile missions.. . . The practices followed 
by States would seem to indicate that the recognition of any right of passage 
through international waterways for enemy warships when the littoral State is a 
belligerent would be altogether unthinkable."82 
However, whether an armistice agreement ends a state of war is a disputed 
principal of international law. Some international experts agree that a state of 
war exists even subsequent to the signing of an armistice agreement.83 Neverthe-
less, another supportable position with respect to the particular Egypt-Israel 
conflict is that "[n]o state of war existed or exists between Egypt and Israel by 
virtue of the fact that both are members ofthe United Nations Organization and 
such a war is ... incompatible with the obligations and duties of member 
States."84 
The opinions expressed by various nations before the General Assembly in 
1957 seemed to further weaken the Arab position, since the majority sided with 
those theorists who would reject any contention of continuing Egypt-Israel war. 
The U.S. delegate, with whom the British representative concurred,85 expressed 
the view that neither Israel nor Egypt could legally assert any belligerent rights. 86 
The representative of France, Mr. Georges-Picot, affirmed the U.S. position by 
stating that no state of war existed among any of the Gulf states. 87 Furthermore, 
the Secretary-General as well, in his Report of January 24, 1957, endorsed the 
81. See H. SMITH, THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 48-49 (3d ed. 1959). 
82. Baxter, supra note 12, at 202, 208. 
83. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated that an armistice agreement does not end the condition of war 
which still exists between the belligerents. See generally 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 546-51. See also 
Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT'L 1.. 880, 885-86 (1956). Levie argues 
that some writers have misconstrued the Security Council's resolution of September 1951, calling upon 
Egypt to lift its blockade at the Suez Canal. He contends that the Security Council was reacting to a 
potentially dangerous situation rather than attempting to fashion a new rule that an armistice agree-
ment terminates a state of war. !d. at 886. See also Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 434. 
84. BWOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 164. Bloomfield interprets the text of the Armistice Agreement to 
signal "not merely ... a temporary cessation of hostilities but rather as [a] firm and definite step ... 
forward in the direction of permanent peace." Id. at 36. 
85. 11 U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1284, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/PV.667 (1957). 
86. 11 U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1278, para. 36, U.N. Doc. AiPV.666 (1957). Mr. Lodge 
stated that "[o]nce Israel has completed its withdrawal [of the Sinai] in accordance with the resolutions 
of the General Assembly ... there is no basis for either party to the Armistice Agreement to assert or 
exercise any belligerent rights." Id. 
87. !d. at 1280, para. 60. 
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posItIOn of the Security Council, which had concurred in its resolution of Sep-
tember 1, 1951, "that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for 
nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can 
reasonably assert that it actively is a belligerent."88 Most nations, with the excep-
tion of India,89 implicitly or explicitly affirmed the U.S. position that the 
Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949 precluded either signatory from 
claiming that it was an active belligerent.9o Thus, a majority of nations supported 
the conclusion that the Arab states could claim no belligerent right to prevent 
Israeli passage through the Gulf. 
4. The Passage Regime Applicable to the Gulf of Aqaba at the End of 1957 
If, as many nations and publicists recognized, the Gulf were an open sea,91 and 
a state of belligerency were not legally supportable, ships proceeding through 
the Gulf of Aqaba should have theoretically enjoyed unrestricted movement 
through the waterways. Customary international law imposes no requirements 
other than that the maritime state conduct itself reasonably while passing 
through the high seas.92 However, because of the narrow breadth of the Gulf, 
and the location of the navigable entrance,93 any ships bound for the Israeli port 
of Elath must cross the territorial seas of one or all of the other littoral states.94 
Therefore, in reality, ships are bound to comport with the rules of innocent 
passage, the customary regime for passage through territorial waters.95 The 
coastal state, according to the rules of innocent passage, has authority to impose 
restrictions on navigating ships for the protection of its security and maintenance 
of its well-being.96 
88. Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1123 (XI) of 
January 19, 1957, II U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 47,49, U.N. Doc. A/3512 (1957). 
89. India claimed that the General Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949 did not establish a 
state of peace: "My Government desires to state that an armistice is a condition of suspended war; it is 
not a condition of peace." II U.N. GAOR (665th plen. mtg.) at 1269, para. 46, U.N. Doc. NPV.665 
(1957). 
90. Those nations expressly affirming the United States position were France, Great Britain, Italy, 
and New Zealand. India was the only nation that insisted that Egypt could still assert belligerent rights in 
the Gulf. II U.N. GAOR (666th Plen. mtg.) at 1280, para. 60 (France), U.N. Doc. NPV.666 (1957); II 
U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1284, para. 14 (Great Britain); 1287, para. 50 (Italy); 1292, para. 99 
(New Zealand), U.N. Doc. NPV.667 (1957). 
91. See text accompanying note 30 & note 73 supra; see generally discussion in §§ II.A.I & 2 supra. 
92. LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 36. 
93. See note 9 supra. 
94. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 175, who state that "neither Israel nor Jordan could 
reach the Red Sea via the Gulf of Aqaba without traversing the territorial seas claimed by Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia." This statement would be true even if Egypt and Saudi Arabia claimed six miles of territorial 
sea. !d. at n. 4. 
95. See LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 46; see McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 174-79, 184-87; see P. 
JESSUP, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 119-20 (1927). 
96. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 179-84. 
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Possibly recogmzmg that the Gulf was or could be totally encom passed in 
territorial sea,97 Israel argued before the International Law Commission in 1956 
for an innocent passage regime.98 However, in essence, Israel asked for a regime 
that was almost indistinguishable from a high seas freedom of navigation re-
gime.99 Israel asserted that "the right of passage for the ships of all nations ... is 
97. See Addendum to Comments by Governments on The Provisional Articles Concerning the 
Regime of the High Seas and the Draft Articles on the Regime of the Territorial Sea Adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its Seventh Session, 2 V.B. INT'L L. COMM·N. 54-55, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN. 4/99/ Add.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Addend um]. Israel was concerned thatthe International 
Law Commission had not required that states recognize a breadth of only three miles of territorial sea. 
Israel stated that 
the addition of [Article 3] ... opens the way ... to the creation of new disputes. Either the law 
does, or the law does not, present an absolute maximum for the breadth of the territorial sea. 
If it does, then the Commission must say so and indicate how it proposes to deal with the 
existing situation in which a great number of States are likely to be found to have a different 
limit. 
Id. at 55. State practice recognized a three mile maximum breadth of territorial sea. As discussed in note 
3 supra, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt claimed territorial seas of 12 miles in 1958. Heinzen, TIw 
Three-Miu Limit: Preserving tlw Freedom of tlw Seas, II STAN. L. REv. 597,643 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
Heinzen]. See also Moser, A Survey oftlw Definition of Internalional Straits and tlw Issue of "Stalus Mixtus, " 3 
ISR. L. REv. 50, 59 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moser]. 
98. See Gross, supra note 4, at 572-73. 
99. See id. 
Innocent passage, the passage regime associated with territorial waters, is normally more restricted 
than freedom of navigation. See O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 97. "Obviously, 'innocent passage,' under 
its most generous interpretation, is a much narrower doctrine than 'freedom of navigation.' Freedom of 
navigation ... requires no characterization .... [I]t is what is done. Innocent passage, however, requires 
the coastal State to characterize the passage as appropriately innocent." Reisman, TIw Regime of Straits 
and National Security: An Appraisal of International Law-Making, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 65 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Reisman]. 
The term freedom of navigation is, as is much of the terminology associated with the law of the sea, a 
term that has changed over time with the evolution of maritime use of the oceans. Lapidoth mentions 
some historic uses of the term: freedom from "danger of pirates," "inviolability of private property at 
sea in time of war," "freedom of movement and trade" and "the right to enter foreign ports." LAPIDOTH, 
supra note 2, at 11-12. Although the specific definition may vary according to the particular political and 
historical context, generally the term is associated with the passage regime applicable to the high seas. 
Since the high seas are ocean areas which cannot be occupied by any state, ships passing through those 
areas are not bound by any national regulations. Freedom of navigation, also referred to as free transit 
or free passage, implies "liberty and equality of navigation." G. SMITH, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF 
FREE SEAS: MODERN MARITIME LAW RE-EvALUATED 78 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SMITH]; COLOMBOS, 
supra note 26, at 65. Thus, Israel's words "absolutely unqualified" passage for ships, implied a regime 
closer to freedom of navigation than to innocent passage. See COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 65-66. The 
concept of freedom of the high seas has also evolved to encompass the freedom to fish, to lay submarine 
cables and to fly over the high seas. Id. 
However, although freedom of navigation implies the greatest latitude accorded a maritime nation on 
the ocean, the term is not absolute. A state's use of the high seas must be limited in the interest of other 
nations that wish to make use of the high seas. See LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 12. Some restrictions upon 
freedom of navigation may be necessary as use of the oceans becomes more widespread. Increased risk 
of pollution, and conflicts over use of sea-bed resources and fisheries, may dictate such restrictions. Id. 
McDougal and Burke state that" [i]n past practice, the freedom of the seas has meant that each state 
was free to use the oceans in accommodation with other uses, not that each state was given a license to 
engage in any activity irrespective of effects upon the interests of otlwrs." McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 
81 (emphasis added). The authors criticize subsequent efforts to objectify the concept by formulating 
specific criteria by which freedom of the seas may be defined, without specifically providing for means 
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and must remain absolutely unqualified, and the littoral State or States have no 
right whatsoever, so long as the matter is not regulated by Convention, to hinder, 
hamper, impede or suspend the free passage of those ships." Israel also argued 
that "[tJhe interests of the international community must here have absolute 
predominance over those of the littoral States whose territorial waters have to be 
traversed in making for a given harbour."loo Although Israel was referring 
specifically to passage through the Strait of Tiran, its comments were indicative 
of the type of passage that Israel believed would be appropriate, to safeguard its 
interests, in the territorial sea of either the Strait or the Gulf.lol 
Israel pressed for this non-suspendable passage regimel02 before the Interna-
tional Law Commission in response to the Commission's adoption, at its seventh 
session in 1955, of provisional articles which were not completely beneficial to 
Isreal. lo3 The Commission had agreed on a non-suspendable innocent passage 
regime, but only for "straits normally used for international navigation between 
two parts of the high seas."I04 Although state practice had prohibited the suspen-
sion of innocent passage in the territorial sea,I05 the International Law Commis-
sion specified that a coastal state could suspend passage in its territorial sea, 
except in "straits normally used for international navigation between two parts of 
the high seas," if it deemed such passage prejudicial to its security.lo6 In spite of 
Israeli challenge to the Commission's work, at the close of the eighth session, 
Israel had still not persuaded the Commission to accept the Israeli views. The 
to resolve conflicting interests of nations that wish to use the high seas for their own purposes. !d. at 
82-86. 
100. Addendum, supra note 97, at 56. 
101. See id. at 59. Israel was concerned, when referring to the innocent passage regime the Commis-
sion had formulated, that the provision did not place emphasis upon freedom of transit. Id. 
102. Innocent passage, the transit regime applicable to passage through a particular state's territorial 
waters, enables the coastal state to impose restrictions on passage. See COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 132; 
see McDOUGAL & BURKE,supra note 2, at 179-84. By arguing for a regime that would prohibit the coastal 
state from impeding in any way the passage of ships, Israel was substituting the term "non-suspendable 
innocent passage" for "free transit" or "freedom of navigation" which implied the absence of any state 
regulation. See note 99 supra. 
103. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Seventh Session, 2 May-8 
july, 1955, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.9) art. 18 (4) at 20, U.N. Doc. Ai2934 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 
Report of I.L.C., Seventh Session]. 
104. Id. 
105. The definition of innocent passage, like the definition of freedom of navigation, has changed. 
However, until the 1958 Geneva Convention, the practice of states had been to recognize the right of 
foreign merchant vessels to pass innocently and peacefully through their territorial waters, which 
included the right to stop and weigh anchor, if those acts were part of normal navigation. COLOMBOS, 
supra note 26, at 132-33. Although international law theorists advocated a coastal state's ability to restrict 
passage through its territorial waters, in practice ships routinely used the world's territorial waters 
without much threat of interference. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 214. A coastal state had the 
option to characterize the passage as innocent or non-innocent. See P. JESSUP, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL 
WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 121-23 (1927). 
106. Article 18 (3), Report of the I.L.C., Seventh Session, supra note 103, at 20. 
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Commission was unwilling to lay down a new rule for the Gulf of Aqaba and the 
Strait of Tiran, because it considered the conflict there to be unique. lo7 The 
Commission refused to extend the non-suspendable innocent passage regime to 
govern a situation other than that of straits connecting two parts of the high 
seas. lOB 
Subsequent to the Commission's work, the Secretary-General of the U.N. 
General Assembly, in 1957, recognized what were and continued to be the claims 
of various world powers: that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, 
through which innocent passage could not be suspended. lo9 Pursuant to the 
107. See Commentary (4) to Article 17, Report of the I.L.C .. Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 20. 
lOS. Sec id. 
Two problems, from Israel's viewpoint, were inherent in the International Law Commission's defini-
tion of "innocent passage." First. the Commission failed to clearly and objectively define innocent 
passage. Article 15 of the International Law Commission's draft read: "Passage is innocent so long as the 
ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal State 
or contrary to the present rules. or to other rules of international law." Art. 15 (3), Report of the I.L.C., 
Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 6. Although the Commission did specify in its commentary to Article 15 
some acts which would be considered "non-innocent" (e.g., "all matters relating to customs and to 
import, export and transit prohibitions," "questions relating to .. health" and "laws relating to 
transport and navigation"), id. at 19, the Commission still left the term vague and subject to conflicting 
interpretations. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 249. Thus, a maritime nation could not be certain 
which acts would subject innocent passage to suspension while passing through the territorial sea of a 
coastal state. See id. 
Second, the Commission's formulation of innocent passage had the effect of vesting discretion in the 
Loastal state to determine whether passage was innocent or nOll-innocent. The Commission's commen-
tary to Article 17 (Rights of protection of the coastal State) stated: "This article recognizes the right of 
the coastal State to verify the innocent character of the passage." Commentary (I) to Art. 17, Report of 
the I.L.C., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 19. Israel was concerned, particularly with reference to 
straits passage, that the Commission's draft might give to a coastal state the authority to suspend passage 
whenever it felt that passage was not "innocent." See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 90-9\. The vague 
notion of what might constitute innocent passage, combined with coastal authority to determine 
innocence, would leave a maritime state too much at the lllercy of the coastal state's whims. See 
Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. Il'iT'L L. 80 I, S09 (19S0) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. 
109. See Report by the Secretary-General in pursuant of General Assembly Resolution 1123 (XI) of 
January 19, 1957, II U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 47, 49, U.N. Doc. Al3512 (1957). The 
Secretary-General's views were consistent with those expressed in February and March of that year by 
many nations. For example. in an aide memoire handed to Israeli Ambassador Eban on February 11, 
1957, Secretary of State Dulles stated: "The U.S. believes the Gulf and access thereto comprehends 
international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf 
and through the Straits giving access thereto." Text of aide memoire handed to Israeli Ambassador 
Abba Eban by Secretary of State Dulles, 36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 393 (1957). The French representative 
considered the Gulf to be international waters, in which no nation could prevent free and innocent 
passage. II U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 12S0, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 (1957). The 
representatives from Great Britain, Italy, the l\'etherlands. New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark concurred in that view at the 667th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. II 
U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1284, paras. 12,13 (Great Britain); 1287, para. 51 (Italy); 1288, paras. 
56-61 (Netherlands); 1292, para. 103 (New Zealand); 1294, para. 124 (Australia); 1296, para. 139 
(Belgium); 1300, para. 196 (Norway); 1303, paras. 224 (Sweden), 234 (Denmark), U.N. Doc. AlPV.667 
(1957). 
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General Assembly Resolution of January 19, 1957,110 he formulated a general 
rule allowing innocent passage through the Gulf and the Strait.lll However, as 
the Secretary-General acknowledged, the extent of this right of passage re-
mained unciarifiedY2 
B. Strait of Tiran 
The Strait of Tiran is the only entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, connecting the 
Gulf at the southern tip to the Red Sea. The two islands of Tiran and Sanafir lie 
in the waters ofthe Strait, with the larger, Tiran Island, separating the Strait into 
two entrances. Due to reefs, the only channel through which navigation is 
possible for large ships lies less than one mile from the Egyptian shores on the 
Sinai PeninsulaY3 Therefore, the navigable entrance to the Gulf is situated in 
Egyptian territorial waters.1l4 
The regime for territorial straits prior to the 1958 Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea1l5 was incorporated in the regime of territorial waters. Under that 
earlier regime, maritime nations were entitled to innocent passage through 
territorial straits, unless the strait was the subject of an international convention 
providing for a specific regime or was used for international navigationY6 
110. G.A. Res. 1123 (XI), 11 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 76, U.N. Doc. A1RESl453 
(1957). That resolution requested the Secretary-General to "continue his efforts for securing the 
complete withdrawal of Israel" from the Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza areas. 
Ill. Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1123 (XI) of 
January 19, 1957, 11 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 47,49, U.N. Doc. A13512 (1957). 
112. [d. Various nations, including Colombia and India, argued for a state's rights to supervise 
passage through its territorial sea, in order to protect its own interests. II U.N. GAOR (667th plen. 
mtg.) at 1291, 1301, U.N. Doc. A1PV.667 (1957). 
Unfortunately, political, rather than legal, considerations formed the basis of the characterization of 
the Gulf as "international"; hence, the participants at the meeting of the General Assembly made no 
contribution to formulating a legal definition of the right of passage in the Gulf. The context in which so 
many nations were willing to label the Gulf of Aqaba as "international" indicates that this characteriza-
tion may have been more politically than legally motivated. The debated issue arose in connection with 
Israel's proposed withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Since many nations awaited that event, their 
ready affirmance of the Gulfs international status may have been motivated by their effort to expedite 
Israel's withdrawal. The representative of Canada was troubled by the lack of legal basis in the 
characterization. Although he agreed that nations should respect free and innocent passage through 
the Gulf for political reasons, he emphasized that the participants of the General Assembly should be 
aware that their decision to label the Gulf "international" was not legally based. The participants, acting 
as a political body, could make a recommendation that there be no interference with passage in the 
Gulf, but only a legal body could decide the international legal aspects of that decision. Statement of 
Canadian delegate Mr. Pearson, II U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1296, paras. 148-49, U.N. Doc. 
A1PV.667 (1957). See also Statement of Norwegian delegate Mr. Engen, id. at 1300, para. 196. 
113. Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 415; Kennedy, supra note 22, at 31. This Comment assumes 
that the Sinai Peninsula is part of Egypt's territory. See LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 53 n. 146. However, 
some writers have expressed contrary views. See sources cited in id. 
114. See note 9 supra. 
115. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19. 
116. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 198-99. See also COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 197. 
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Under either of the two exceptions, coastal states could not prohibit freedom of 
navigation. 117 
The first exception was inapplicable to the Gulf and Strait, since, before the 
1958 Conference, no existing international agreement established standards for 
the regulation of passage through the waterways.us However, the second excep-
tion provided the rationale for the argument that maritime nations had the right 
to pass freely and completely unimpeded through the Strait of Tiran. 
1. The Evolving Test for Determining the "Internationality" of a Strait 
The concept of an "international" strait in international law is an amorphous 
idea, and is, therefore, susceptible of changing definition. "Internationalized," in 
1958, was a term that had not yet acquired an established meaning, but which 
denoted the status of an area of water that had been dedicated by treaty to the 
public use of all or a large number of states. 119 However, as nations began to 
recognize the importance of straits use, the definition of an international strait 
came into question. Experts in the international community began to advocate 
the view that passage through straits should be free from coastal state interfer-
ence. 120 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, international law generally consid-
ered a strait to have an international character only if it connected two parts of 
the high seas, even if the strait totally comprised territorial waters.121 However, 
in a report prepared by international experts for the Fifth Assembly of the 
League of Nations a new element emerged. The report concluded that not only 
did an international strait have to connect two parts of the high seas, not includ-
ing inland seas,122 but, in addition, in the case of warships, the report included 
the new requirement that the strait be used for international navigation.123 
In 1949, the International Court of Justice announced the standard for the 
117. See COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 197. 
118. See text accompanying notes 217-18 infra for conflicting views on whether Article 16(4) of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea was specifically intended to cover this particular situation, i.e .. the 
Strait of Tiran. Even if the Convention was so intended. the one provision does not approximate the 
type of international convention mentioned by international theorists as fulfilling this requirement. 
such as the Constantinople Treaty of 1888. which provides a specific passage regime through the Suez 
Canal. and the Montreux Convention. which sets guidelines for regulation of passage through the 
Straits of the Dardanelles. 
119. See Moser. supra note 97. at 50-51. 
120. McDoUGAL & BURKE. supra note 2. at 199. 
121. Grandison & Meyer. supra note 3. at 397; Moser. supra note 97. at 56. 
122. Publication of the League of Nations. V. Legal Questions. V. 7. 252. cited in Moser. supra note 
97. at 53 nn. 20-21. 
123. [d. at 246. cited in Moser. supra note 97. at 53 n.22. 
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internationality of a strait, at least with reference to warships, in the decision of 
the Corfu Channel case.124 
In that case, the Court decided a controversy between the United Kingdom 
and Albania. Specifically, the parties raised the issue of passage in reference to 
the incident of May 1946, when Albanian coastal batteries attacked British war-
ships passing through the Corfu Channel, which lies partially in the territorial 
waters of Albania. Britain argued persuasively for a right of innocent passage 
through the strait. The Court, in an often quoted passage, held: 
It is ... generally recognized and in accordaflce with international 
custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their war-
ships through straits used for international navigation between two 
parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal 
State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise pre-
scribed in an international convention, there is no right for it coastal 
State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace.125 
The Court found that ships used the channel for international navigation; the 
fact that the strait was not the primary route of access to the Aegean and Adriatic 
Seas was unimportant. 126 According to the Court's decision, as long as the strait 
was used for international navigation and connected two parts of the high seas, it 
had an "international" character.127 However, although the Court recognized 
the importance of the waterway's use and of free maritime communication,128 
the fact that the channel connected two high seas was still a major determining 
factor in the decision that the coastal state could not prohibit innocent passage 
through the North Corfu Channel. 
2. The "Internationality" Test Before the International Law Commission 
Although the Corfu Channel case emphasized the overall "importance of free-
dom of transportation and communication" through the use of straits,129 the 
Court's decision did not explicitly refer to passage of merchant vessels. There-
124. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4. Lapidoth states that the standard 
announced in the Corfu Channel Case was merely a restatement of customary international law. 
LAPlDoTH, supra note 2, at 39. 
125. Corfu Channel Case at 28 (emphasis original). 
126. [d. 
127. See Lapidoth, Passage Through the Strait of Bab Al-Mandeb, 13 ISR. L. REV. 180, 184-85; see 
McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 207. These authors emphasize the Court's use of geographical 
criteria as the test of internationality. /d. Compare R. BAXTER &: J. TRISKA, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATERWAYS 9 (1964). The authors state that the Court emphasizes the practices of shipping rather than 
geographic necessities. [d. Grandison and Meyer analyze the case by pointing out that the Court's 
characterization of the channel as an international highway was one of the factors that shaped the 
outcome. Grandison & Meyer, supra note 3, at 397-99. 
128. McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 206. 
129. [d. at 207. 
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fore, when the International Law Commission began to codify the law of the 
sea,130 it found that the Corfu Channel standard failed to expressly apply to 
merchant ships. Furthermore, how frequently an "international" strait must be 
used for international navigation remained unclear. After working for seven 
years on its Law of the Sea Draft Articles,131 the Commission made some 
progress in clarifying the law regarding passage through straits. 
The Commission specifically noted that its final draft regarding innocent passage 
applied to merchant ships as well as to warships.132 In addition, the Commission 
attempted to restrict the authority of coastal states over straits.133 Article 17(4) of 
the Commission's provisions concerning the law of the sea stated: "There must 
be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits nor-
mally used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas."134 
Thus, under the Commission's formulation, navigators of merchant ships as well 
as warships had the right to expect a coastal state to respect their innocent 
passage during time of peace. The Commission also attempted to resolve the 
"use" criterion, left vague by the International Court of Justice, by providing that 
an international strait was one which was "normally" used for international 
navigation.135 In these two respects, the Commission refined and expanded the 
Corfu Channel standard. By incorporating those more explicit changes into its 
report to the U.N. General Assembly, the Commission could be seen as having 
made progress beyond the Corfu Channel rule in defining more precisely the law 
of straits passage. 
However, Article 17(4) of the Draft Articles still required that an international 
strait connect two parts of the high seas, and this formulation created a problem 
for Israel. Israel could not be certain that the Strait of Tiran would satisfy that 
test. Under the Commission's definition of an international strait, the Strait of 
Tiran could be considered international only if the two bodies of water it 
connected were high seas. Even if the Red Sea fell into that category, in 1956, 
whether the Gulf of Aqaba could be defined as high seas was questionable. The 
use of a geographical test for defining an international strait and attendant right 
of innocent passage created a problem because of the constantly changing limits 
of territorial sea claimed by littoral Gulf states.136 This problem was especially 
apparent in the Gulf of Aqaba. Previous to 1949, the littoral states had claimed 
130. See note 26 supra. 
131. The first session of the Commission took place in 1949; the last session. which produced the 
final Draft Articles, took place in 1956. Introduction, Report of the I.L.C., Eighth Session,supra note 26, 
at 1-2. 
132. Commentary (I) to Section III, Report of the I.L.C., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 18. 
133. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 208. 
134. Article 17(4), Report of the I.L.C., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 6 (emphasis added). 
135. See id. 
136. See generally Heinzen, supra note 97, at 639-43 (Saudi Arabia and Egypt claimed enlarged 
territorial seas in 1958.). 
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three miles of territorial sea, leaving a belt of high seas in the middle of the Gulf 
which would thus give the Gulf the status of open or high seas. However, after 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt enlarged their territorial seas to six miles and twelve 
miles, respectively, encompassing the entire Gulf in territorial waters, the Gulf 
theoretically no longer had the status of high seas. 137 Thus, under the geograph-
ical test, the Strait would have lost its international character with the enlarge-
ment of the littoral states' territorial seas. 
Another problem Israel would then encounter arose out of the Commission's 
attempt to qualify the "use" criterion of an international strait. The words 
"normally used for international navigation," which the Commission added to the 
Corfu Channel test, implied that if a strait were not in frequent use, passage could 
be more easily suspended. Since "normally" was a word without precise defini-
tion, Israel could not be assured that the Strait of Tiran satisfied this criterion.13B 
Unless the Strait of Tiran could satisfy both requirements, it would not qualify 
as an international strait, and the non-suspendable innocent passage regime for 
international straits set out by the Commission would be inapplicable.139 Israel 
would be left without assurance of a right to unimpeded navigation through the 
Strait. Thus, during the eighth session of the International Law Commission, 
Israel urged the Commission to decide that every strait giving access to a port 
(referring to Elath) be considered international.14o The Commission, however, 
failed to adopt the revised test proposed by Israel. The Commission concluded 
that its non-suspendable innocent passage regime was inapplicable to the Strait 
of Tiran l41 because the Strait of Tiran connected high seas with territorial sea, 
not with another part of the high seas. 
3. Strait of Tiran as a Strait Giving Access to an "International" Waterway: 
The Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
One significant change that occurred during the meetings of the General 
Assembly from 1956 to 1957 was that many nations began to argue for a right of 
innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran based on their own interpretation 
that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway.142 The label "international 
137. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text, supra. 
138. Cf Slonim, supra note 26, at 113 n.68 ("The port of Eilath was not in 'normal' use prior to 1956 
because of the threat posed by Egyptian coastal batteries at Sharm-el-Sheikh."). 
139. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra. 
140. See generally Addendum, supra note 97, at 56 (Israel commented that ships passing through the 
Strait should enjoy unqualified passage rights.). 
141. Cf Commentary (4) to Art. 17(4), Report of the 1.L.c., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 20 (The 
Commission would not formulate a rule for the legal position of Straits forming part of the territorial 
sea of one or more States and constituting the sole means of access to the port of another State.). 
142. See statements of delegates from France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 11 U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1280, para. 58 
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waterways" for the Gulf may have been a substitute for high seas.143 Alterna-
tively, the term "international," as used in the General Assembly, may have been 
a political, rather than a legal, definition.144 
Nevertheless, regardless of the imprecise terminology, many nations agreed 
with Israel that the Strait and Gulf should be considered "international" in 
character,145 and that innocent passage should be extended to ships traversing 
the Strait.146 The Secretary-General stated that innocent passage would apply in 
the Strait of Tiran, even though the extent of the passage had not been agreed 
upon. 147 
The delegate of the Netherlands was the only U.N. participant to offer a legal 
rationale for his concurrence in the rule that the Strait was an international 
waterway:148 
(France), U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 (1957); 11 U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1284, paras. 12, 13 (Great 
Britain); 1287, para. 51 (Italy); 1288, paras. 56-61 (Netherlands); 1292, para. 103 (New Zealand); 1294, 
para. 124 (Australia); 1296, para. 139 (Belgium); 1300, para. 196 (Norway); 1303, paras. 224 (Swe-
den), 234 (Denmark), U.N. Doc. A/PV.667 (1957). 
143. The French representative, for example, stated that the French government considered the 
Gulf to be "international" by virtue of its breadth and the fact that it bordered four different nations; 
consequently, he believed that freedom of navigation should apply in the Strait giving access to the Gulf. 
11 U.N. GAOR(666th plen. mtg.) at 1280, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 (1957). His statement suggests 
a possible attempt at a legal definition of the waterway. However, as of 1957, the international 
community used only the terminology of "high seas" and "territorial waters" to refer to innocent 
passage regimes for waterways. The term "international waterways" had no precise legal meaning. 
Thus, perhaps the French representative'S language was imprecise. 
144. For example, the Canadian delegate stated: 
I am not now suggesting ... that legal rights in those waters should be determined by the 
Assembly .... What I do suggest, however, is that, in order to maintain a situation of peace and 
quiet ... the Assembly should recommend ... as a political and not a legal act ... that there 
should be no interference with the innocent passage of ships through the waters concerned. 
11 U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1296, para. 148, U.N. Doc. A/PV.667 (1957). The Norwegian 
delegate also stated: "[I)t is the view of the Government of Norway that these waters constitute an 
international waterway and that no State bordering on this waterway should undertake measures which 
would hamper the right of ships of any nation to innocent passage." However, he also stated that "[t)he 
question of determining the legal status of these waters is a different matter and should be dealt with 
only by a legal body." [d. at 1300, para. 196. According to the Corfu Channel case and the International 
Law Commission's Draft Article 17(4), which were the most recent indices of international law regard-
ing international straits, a strait was international only if the bodies of water it connected were legally 
high seas. See text accompanying notes 127 & 134supra. Therefore, the fact that the Norwegian represen-
tative would have deferred to a legal body to determine the legal status of the waters suggested that he 
based his characterization of the Strait on non-legal reasoning. See also note 112 supra. 
145. See statements by delegates of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, 11 U.N. GAOR (666th plen. mtg.) at 1277, 
para. 33 (United States); 1280, para. 58 (France), U.N. Doc. A/PV.666 (1957); 11 U.N. GAOR (667th 
plen. mtg.) at 1284, para. 13 (Great Britain); 1287, para. 51 (Italy); 1288, paras. 56-61 (Netherlands); 
1292, para. 103 (New Zealand); 1294, para. 124 (Australia); 1296, para. 139 (Belgium); 1300, para. 196 
(Norway); 1303, para. 234 (Denmark), U.N. Doc. A/PV.667 (1957). 
146. [d. 
147. Report by the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for 
withdrawal of troops and other measures, 11 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 66) at 42, 44, U.N. 
Doc. A/3500 (1957). 
148. 11 U.N. GAOR (667th plen. mtg.) at 1288, para. 57-61, U.N. Doc. A/PV.667 (1957). 
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First, inasmuch as the Gulf of Aqaba ... has a width in excess of the 
three miles of territorial waters of the four littoral States on either 
side, it is, under the rules of international law , to be regarded as part 
of the open sea. Secondly, the Straits of Tiran consequently, in the 
legal sense, [are] straits connecting two open seas, normally used for 
international navigation. Thirdly, in regard to such straits, there is a 
right of free passage. 149 
Underlying the delegate's reasoning was the assumption that international law 
would accept only a three mile claim of territorial waters.t so If the Gulf's littoral 
states could only claim three miles, then the Gulf would have the status of open 
sea because of the remaining marginal belt in the center. 
Thus, before the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference, most nations 
considered the Strait of Tiran to be an international waterway, open to all 
foreign ships for innocent passage. However, the definition was still not legally 
satisfactory. It left unresolved the extent and exact definition of the innocent 
passage regime that would apply in the Strait and Gulf areas. Even the Nether-
lands delegate, who had legally justified his conclusion that the rules of innocent 
passage should govern passage of ships through the Strait, did not attempt to 
enumerate the criteria by which the innocent passage regime should be im-
plemented. 
III. CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZoNE 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1105151 the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea convened at Geneva in 1958.152 Four Conventions 
emerged from the Conference: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone;153 the Convention on the High Seas;154 the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas;155 and the 
149.Id. 
150. Heinzen, supra note 97, at 641. 
151. G. A. Res. 1105 (XI), 11 V.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 53) at 87, V.N. Doc. NRESl478 
(1957). The General Assembly recommended that 
an international conference of plenipotentiaries should be convoked to examine the law of the 
sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and 
political aspects of the problem, and to embody the results of its work in one or more 
international conventions or such other instruments as it may deem appropriate. 
Id. at para. 2. 
152. Id. at para. 4. 
153. Convention on the Territorial Sea,supra note 19. The treaty became effective on September 10, 
1964, after having been ratified by 22 states. 
154. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 V.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 V.N.T.S. 
82. 
155. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 
1958,17 V.S.T. 138, T.T.A.S. No. 5969, 559 V.N.T.S. 285. 
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Convention on the Continental ShelL I56 The Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone (the Convention) is relevant for purposes of the 
following discussion. 
While neither Saudi Arahia, Jordan nor Egypt signed the 1958 Convention, 
the Convention was significant because it codified customary international law. 
The Convention represented, as of 1958, "the best consensus of present interna-
tional opinion regarding the law of the sea."157 Therefore, although only Israel 
ratified the Convention,I:;R the Arab nations would be bound as well to respect 
the rules of international law embodied in the COI1Yention, which represented, at 
that time, the accepted practice of a majority of states. 15" 
A. The Conl'ention in General 
The only provision of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone that pertains to gulfs is Article 7, which refers to bays belonging to one 
156. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 
C.N.T.S. 311. 
157. Selak, supra note 7, at 685. But see Gross, supra note 4, at 593. 
158. Israel ratified the Convention on the Territorial Sea on September 6, 1961. Status 01 Multilat-
eral Conventions, signatures. ratifications, etc. received by the Secretary-General during the month of 
September 1961, Report No.9 at iii, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3, Rev. I (1961). 
159. Cf. SMITH, supra note 99, at 91 (the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference was essentially concerned 
with codifying existing law). 
D'Amato states that a treaty "is a clear record of a binding international commitment that constitutes 
the 'practice of states' and hence is as much a record of customary behavior as any other state act or 
restraint." D'AMATo,supm note 28, at 104. He emphasizes that the provisions ofa multilateral treaty arc 
not necessarily, in themselves, binding on non-signatories. However, a multilateral treaty may give rise 
to gelleral rules of custom, which are binding on all states. [d. at 106-07. 
Certain types of treatie~ do not give rise to rules of custom. Included ill that category are treaties 
"creating international regimes for the use of a waterway ... [and] treaties providing for the navigation 
of international rivers or waterways." "Valdock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Law of Treaties 
[Agenda Item 3], 2 Y.B. INT'!. COMM'". 27, U.N. Doc. AJCN.4/167 (1964). However, that definition is 
inapplicable to the Convention on the Territorial Sea. The Convention enunciates general principles 
applying to all, rather than to specific, waterways. Semnd, even if Article 16(4) of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea, which allows for non-sllspcndable passage through straits connecting high seas with the 
territorial sea of a state, applies specific'ally to the Strait of Tiran, the purpose of the Convention was to 
mdify the law of the sea. Sa G.A. Res. 1105 (XI), II U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 53) at 87, U.N. 
Doc. AJRES/47 H (1957); SMITH, supra note 99, at 91. Although the Convention does not ex plicitly state 
that it represents a codification of international law, Gross, supra note 4, at 593, the fact that 44 nations 
are parties to the Convention is evidence that the.Convention represents accepted state practice. OFFICE 
OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9136, TREATIES IN FORCE 311 (1981). Pharand 
notes that Canada, which did not ratify the Convention on the Territorial Sea, cannot argue that only 
customary international law regulates the rights of innocent passage in the Northwest Passage, since the 
Convention is "evidence of general international law." Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, 6 CAN. 
Y.B. INT'1. L. 3, 58-59 (1968). D'Amato, as well, notes that there are several "areas of international law 
shaped largely by treaty" and cites to the Geneva Conventions on the Law ufthe Sea as having "a direct 
and immediate impact upon international law. In considering any problem arising since 1958, one can 
hardly avoid referring to the Geneva conventions, regardless of whether the interested parties have 
signed them." D'AMATO, supra, at 137. For a comprehensive discussion of the effect of treaties on 
customary international law, see id. at 103-66. 
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state!60 It is inapplicable to the Gulf of Aqaba, since the Convention does not 
concentrate on the problem of bays or gulfs surrounded by more than one state. 
The two other possible classification alternatives for the Gulf, at the time of the 
Conference, were that of high seas, and that of territorial waters. Considering 
that the drafters of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles did not 
accept a high seas characterization for the Gulf of Aqaba, the Convention rules 
for the territorial sea must be applied to the Gulf of Aqaba.161 
Controversy exists over whether the Convention rules regulate passage only in 
time of peace, or whether they apply, as well, in time of war. Since the Interna-
tional Law Commission's draft, which formed the basis for the Convention, was 
applicable only in time of peace,I62 authorities have suggested that the Conven-
tion only embodies peace-time law.163 Alternatively, authorities have argued that 
the Convention's clear failure to adopt the International Law Commission's draft 
demonstrates that the drafters intended the Convention to govern passage 
regulation in times of both war and peace.164 The distinction would, of course, 
only be important if the Arab states' claim of war status were valid. 16s 
A second unresolved question is whether the Convention's innocent passage 
scheme applies to warships when used in the Gulf's territorial waters.166 On its 
face, the Convention purports to formulate specific rules for merchant vessels 
and warships, but only after it sets out the general rules applicable to both.167 
160. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 7. The introductory sentence of Article 7 
reads: "I. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State." Id. 
161. Assuming that the Saudi Arabian claim to the Gulf as historic national waters were correct, the 
Convention rules on territorial sea would be inapplicable. See § II.A. 2 supra. Article 7 does not apply to 
historic bays. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 7(6). 
162. Report of the LL.C., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 4. 
163. Merani & Sterling, supra note 9, at 428. The authors furth_er note that many writers have 
ignored the war/peace distinction.Id. at 429 n.43. However, an assumption that in times of war a coastal 
state, for its own protection, has greater latitude to regulate the passage of ships through its territorial 
waters would be reasonable. Even if the definition of "innocent" is more objective under the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea than under the rules of customary international law, Article 14 still gives the 
coastal state some leeway to characterize passage as innocent or non-innocent. Convention on the 
Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 14. Presumably, a coastal state, prohibited from discriminating 
against foreign ships by virtue of Article 16(3), id. art. 16(3), will suspend passage only truly prejudicial 
to its security. In such event, that state would probably have no difficulty in proving the threat. A 
reasonable interpretation of the Convention gives a coastal state the ability, even in time of war, to 
effectively regulate passage or suspension of ships in accordance with the rules of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea. 
164. Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulfof Aqaba, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 
142 (1968). 
165. See § ILA.3 supra. 
166. Sionim, supra note 26, at 119; Przetacznik, Freedom of Navigation Through Territorinl Sea and 
International Straits, 55 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES 222, 
228 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Przetacznik]. The territorial waters referred to here do not include 
straits, which the Convention on the Territorial Sea considers separately. Convention on the Territorial 
Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(4). 
167. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, arts. 14-17. 
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Sub-section A of Section III ("Right of Innocent Passage") is entitled "Rules 
applicable to all ships."168 Sub-section B of Section III ("Rules applicable to 
merchant ships") outlines specifics after setting out a general scheme in Articles 
14_17.169 Sub-section D ("Rules applicable to warships")170 gives the coastal state 
authority to request the warship to leave its waters for non-compliance with its 
general passage regulations. 1 71 
However, some writers argue that the Convention may be read differently, 
and urge that the innocent passage regime does not apply to warships.172 This 
interpretation suggests that the Convention left unresolved the question of 
foreign warship passage through the territorial sea (excluding straits) in time of 
peace. A split of opinion also exists on whether the practice of states before the 
1958 Conference would have supported the innocent passage of warships 
through the territorial sea. One view suggests that if the waters were necessary 
for international traffic, then passage of warships would be governed by the 
innocent passage regime. 173 The contrary position suggests that "[a]s to war-
ships, the sound rule seems to be that they should not enjoy an absolute legal 
right to pass through a state's territorial waters."174 
B. The Gulf of Aqaba 
Although the Convention provides methods of delimiting the territorial sea in 
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8,175 the participants at the 1958 Conference failed to 
168. [d. at Section III, Sub-section A. 
169. See id. at Section III, Sub-section B. Articles 18-20, which appear in Section III, Sub-section B 
deal primarily with tolls, and the criminal and civil jurisdiction of a coastal state. 
170. [d. art. 23. 
171. /d. 
172. Przetacznik, supra note 166. at 228. The author asserts that one must resort to customary 
international law to answer the question. [d. Lapidoth also supports the view of Przetacznik and 
concludes that "the right of innocent passage of warships in ordinary territorial sea is controversial." 
LAPlDOTH. Passage Through the Strait of Bab Al-Mandeb. 13 ISR. L. REv. 180. 185 (1978). 
173. COLOMBOS, supra note 26, at 133. The right seems to depend on the use of the waterway for 
international traffic. See also 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 29. at 494. Oppenheim states that "it is now a 
customary rule of International Law that the right of passage through such parts of the maritime belt as 
form part of the highways for international traffic cannot be denied to foreign men-of-war." /d. 
174. P.JESSUP. THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 120 (1927). See also 1 
E. BRUEL. INTERNATIONAL STRAITS (1947). Briiel expresses the view of some theorists that. although 
warships do not have the right to pass freely through the territorial sea of a foreign state in time of 
peace. many states in practice do allow this passage. See Przetacnik. supra note 166. at 211. for a list of 
those who adhere to the opposing view. McDougal and Burke also note that a majority of participants at 
the Conference felt that warships should enjoy unrestricted access to territorial seas, provided they gave 
prior notification to the coastal state. McDOUGAL & BURKE. supra note 2. at 220. 
175. Convention on the Territorial Sea. supra note 19. arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8. This Comment does not 
discuss the methods of delimiting the territorial sea, for, as of February 1958, both Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, as noted supra note 31. had claimed a breadth of territorial sea of 12 miles each. For a discussion 
of delimitation of baselines, see McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 305-445, and sources cited in 4 M. 
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207-343 (1965). 
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specify a definite limit of territorial sea that coastal nations can legitimately claim 
under the Convention. 176 Further, the Convention does not clarify the extent to 
which nations recognize claims of territorial sea in excess of three miles.177 As a 
result of this failure, the status of the Arabs' claim of more than three miles17s 
remained unresolved in 1958. Had nations uniformly considered the three mile 
limit a rule of international law, the argument of the Gulf as high seas might 
have been successful.179 However, although state practice may have recognized 
claims to territorial sea of no more than three miles,lso "[t]here was no general 
agreement ... as to what the governing rule was."ISI The fact that many states 
had claimed more than three miles of territorial waters made it "difficult to urge 
that any territorial sea beyond three nautical miles and up to 12 [was] unlaw-
ful."ls2 Thus, the premise that the Arab nations could encompass the entire Gulf 
in territorial sea by enlarging their claimsls3 would be implicit in any legal 
argument about the Gulf. 
Assuming that the Gulf of Aqaba consisted of territorial sea as recognized at 
the time of the Conference, the coastal state would be bound by the regime of 
innocent passage. The scheme of innocent passage is governed primarily by 
Section III, Articles 14-16 of the Convention. ls4 Article 14(1) provides that 
"ships of all States ... shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea."IS5 Passage includes (1) "navigation through the territorial sea for 
the purpose either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of 
proceeding to internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal 
waters,"IS6 and (2) "stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are 
incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by 
distress. "IS7 
Although the 1958 Convention thus provided for an innocent passage regime 
176. See Heinzen, supra note 97, at 651. 
177. Heinzen states that all claims exceeding three miles in breadth at the time of the 1958 Confer-
ence were illegal.Id. However, Gross, referring to the United States' claim that the Gulf comprehended 
international waterways, contends that "the argument became a casualty when Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
extended their territorial sea from six to twelve miles." Gross,Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the 
Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 141 (1968). Thus, even if international law would only 
honor a claim of three miles, Israel would have had to contend realistically with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
178. See Gross, Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
124, 141 (1968). See also § II.B.2 supra. 
179. See text accompanying' note 30 supra. 
180. See text accompanying note 150 supra. 
181. Heinzen, supra note 97, at 650. 
182. Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM.]. 
INT'L L. 77, 86 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Moore]. 
183. See note 177 supra. 
184. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, arts. 14-16. 
185. Id. art. 14( I). 
186. Id. art. 14(2). 
187. Id. art. 14(3). 
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through the Gulf, innocent passage was not an established international law 
concept. 1HH Innocent passage could best be defined in reference to a balancing of 
coastal and maritime states' interests. 1A" Because those interests were vague and 
susceptible of subjectivity, coastal and maritime states, alike, would need some 
objective guidelines to ensure against arbitrary misconduct and imposition of 
restrictions. How the Convention resolves the problem of preserving the coastal 
state's right to protect itself, and, at the same time, allows the maximum freedom 
to navigating ships, is, thus, the critical question. One mllst read Articles 14, 15 
and 16 together in order to understand how the Convention would affect tbe 
interests of both the coastal state and the maritime state. 
Article 15 of the Convention states that "[t]he coastal State must not hamper 
innocent passage through the territorial sea."190 The International Law Com-
mission's definition of innocent passage had emphasized the acts of the ship in 
transit. 191 Under that definition, passage was innocent "so long as a ship does not 
use the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the security of the 
coastal State."ln The COIwention changed the terminology and the definition of 
innocent passage, in its adoption of Article 14(4), to read: "Passage is innocent so 
long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State."l9:l The rewording, although minor, produced a significant change in 
meaning. 194 Whereas under the International Law Commission's definition, 
specific acts committed by the ship in transit would determine innocence or 
non-innocence of passage, 190 the Convention emphasized the physical passage of 
the ship, rather than the ship's conduct, as the deciding factor in determining 
innocence or non-innocence. 196 
Whether this change benefitted the coastal or the maritime states is a debatable 
question. In the opinion of at least one authority, the Convention's defll1ition of 
innocent passage applies a more objective standard than does the definition of 
the International Law Commission. According to this authority, the Conven-
tion's definition places the burden on the coastal state to prove non-innocence of 
the passage itself. Therefore, the coastal state has less discretion to suspend, at 
will, the passage of ships through its waters. 197 However, other authorities have 
argued that the definition's focus on the innocence of passage, rather than on the 
ship and its acts, allows the coastal state more freedom to characterize passage as 
188. See notes 2, 102, 105 supra. 
189. See notes 2 & 105 supra. 
190. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 15. 
191. Commentary (3) to Article 15(3), Report of the 1.L.c., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 19. 
192, ld. art. 15(3), at 6. 
193. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 14(4). 
194. McDoUGAL & Bl'RK>, supra note 2, at 258. See also Gross, sup,a note 4, at 582. 
195. See text accompanying note 191 supra. 
196. Compare Article 15(3), supra note 192 with Article 14(4), supra note 193. 
197. Gross, supra note 4, at 582. 
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non-innocent. According to this VIew, without the words of the International 
Law Commission's draft ("a ship does not use the sea for committing any acts"), 
Convention Article 14(4) no longer restricts coastal com petence to 
prohibit passage to considerations arising from incidents occurring 
in the territorial sea. It is now open to the coastal state to take other 
factors into account, including, for example, the purpose of the 
projected passage, the cargo carried, and destination in a third 
state. 19H 
This interpretation of the Convention's definition of innocent passage favors 
the interests of the coastal state, by allowing it to consider not only the acts of the 
ship, but also the nature of the cargo and the ship's destination in deciding 
whether to characterize the passage as innocent. 199 Thus, the coastal state may 
more easily suspend passage under Article I6( I) which stipulates that "[tJhe 
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage 
which is not innocent."20o As these conflicting interpretations indicate,201 the 
Convention did not clarify the meaning of innocent passage. 
An analysis of the background of Article 16(3) further highlights the concern 
of the Conference participants for a more objective definition of innocent pass-
age. Article 16(3) of the Convention allows the coastal state to "suspend tem-
porarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign 
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security."202 The 
Convention adopted this Article in response to the concern of several nations 
that the International Law Commission's draft allowed coastal states too much 
subjective discretion. 203 The International Law Commission's draft had pro-
vided: "The coastal State may suspend temporarily in definite areas of its territo-
rial sea the exercise of the right of passage if it should deem such suspension 
essential for the protection of the rights referred to in paragraph 1."204 With the 
adoption of the new Article 16(3) language, the Convention considerably limited 
the ability of the coastal state to arbitrarily prohibit passage that actually was 
198. Sorensen, "The Law of the Sea," International Conciliation, No. 520, 234 (Nov. 1958), cifRd in 
McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 258. 
199. McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 258. The authors criticize Gross' interpretation for its lack 
of support. Id. at 258 n.221. See also Robertson, supra note 108, at 803. 
200. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(1). 
20 I. The explanation may be that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has 
gone to great lengths to define "innocent passage" in more objective terms. Thus, in comparison, the 
definition adopted by the Convention on the Territorial Sea was subjective. 
202. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(3). 
203. Gross, supra note 4, at 584-85. Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States were 
among the nations concerned with the lack of objectivity in the Commission's Draft. Id. Indonesia, the 
Soviet Union and India took the opposing view. Jd. at 585. 
204. Article 17(3), Report of the I.L.C., Eighth Session, supra note 26, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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innocent. 205 This new provIsIOn eliminated some of the subjective discretion 
given the coastal state under the International Law Commission's draft. Al-
though similar concerns prompted the revision of Article 14(4),206 the Confer-
ence may have reached the opposite result in its adoption of Article 14(4) of the 
Convention. 207 
C. Strait of Tiran 
One important distinction under the 1958 Convention between the regimes 
for regulation of passage in straits208 and regulation of passage in the territorial 
sea is that the coastal state may not suspend innocent passage through straits, but 
may suspend passage through the territorial sea.209 Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
protested the adoption21o by the Conference of the new straits passage regime of 
Article 16(4). This Convention provision states: "There shall be no suspension of 
the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for interna-
tional navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high 
seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State."211 Saudi Arabia made two main 
arguments. The first contention was that the addition of the words "or the 
territorial sea of a foreign State" seemed only to apply to the Strait of Tiran and 
the Gulf of Aqaba. 212 Ambassador Shukairi of Saudi Arabia argued that "the 
amended text no longer dealt with general principles of international law, but 
had been carefully tailored to promote the claims of one State."213 Saudi Arabia 
furthered objected to the addition of the words because, as it argued, on the basis 
of the Corfu Clu1nnel case, the passage regime envisioned in Article 16(4) should 
have applied only to straits connecting two parts of the high seas.214 
Second, several nations objected to the deletion of the word "normally" (be-
fore "used for international navigation") from the International Law Commis-
sion's draft on the ground that this appr.oach had not been used in the Corfu 
205. Cf Sionim, supra note 26, at 103 ("The new draft removed the strictly subjective power of the 
coastal state, which might deem anything a threat to its security, and substituted an objective standard-
allowing suspension of innocent passage only if such suspension is necessary for the protection of the 
state's security."). 
206. Gross, supra note 4, at 583. 
207. See text accompanying notes 190-200 supra. 
208. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(4). Regulation of passage through 
straits is embodied in Article 16(4) of the Convention. 
209. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(3). A coastal state may suspend passage 
through the territorial sea by virtue of Article 16(3) of the Convention. Lapidoth, Passage Through the 
Strait of Bah Al-Mandeh, 13 ISR. L. REv. 180, 185 (1978). 
210. Gross, supra note 4, at 588. 
211. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 16(4). 
212. See U.N. Doc. AlCONF.13/C.1IL.71, March 28, 1958; Official Records, Vol. III, p. 96, para. 6, 
cited in Gross, supra note 4, at 589 n. 156. 
213. [d. 
214. Gross, supra note 4, at 588. 
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Channel case.215 Furthermore, the deletion of "normally" would have restricted 
passage in straits not recognized as international waterways, i.e., those not ordi-
narily used for international navigation.216 
In reference to the first contention, one authority agrees that the rule applied 
specifically to the Arab-Israeli situation, and states that the Convention made 
new law in Article 16(4).217 However, other writers consider the addition merely 
a codification of custom, although one of these writers does acknowledge that 
"the affirmation of this principle ... gave strong support to ... the right of 
passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."218 
In reference to the second contention, the deletion ofthe word "normally" did 
go "beyond the precedent established in the Corfu Case."219 However, the 
language of the Corfu Channel case-"used for international navigation"-
without the word "normally," arguably includes a qualifying concept also.220 
IV. THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
In December 1973, after a U.N. General Assembly Resolution221 calling for an 
updated Law of the Sea Conference, the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was convened.222 The second session in Caracas 
was the first substantive session.223 
At the time of this writing, after nine sessions, UNCLOS participants are 
preparing to convene their final session.224 The United States has agreed to 
rejoin the negotiations, after having examined, during the past year, the UN-
CLOS Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Draft Convention).225 The next 
session of UNCLOS may not produce a final treaty. However, because UN-
CLOS, in the past few sessions, has made no substantial changes to the sections 
dealing with passage through straits and through the territorial sea.226 au-
215. [d. at 586. 
216. See id. 
217. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607. 
621,623 (1958). 
218. Gross, supra note 4. at 589. 
219. Merani & Sterling. supra note 9. at 427. 
220. Gross. supra note 4. at 586-87. 
221. G.A. Res. 3029A, 27 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 30) 21-22. U.N. Doc. Al8730 (1973). cited in 
Robertson. supra note 108. at 817 n.79. 
222. Robertson. supra note 108. at 817. 
223. The first session in December 1973 was primarily procedural. [d. at 819. 
224. U.S. to Return to Sea Parley at U.N., N.Y. Times, Feb. 2. 1982, at A3, col. 1. 
225. [d. Last year. President Reagan announced that the United States would not participate in 
further negotiations until it had "carefully reexamined all the provisions in the complex draft code." [d. 
Mr. Reagan has announced that the United States will still propose changes in the provisions that 
address the deep sea mining area. [d. . 
226. These sections are Part II (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone) and Part III (Straits Used for 
International Navigation). The President of the Conference. in the Explanatory Memorandum. stated 
that the Informal Text was "like its predecessor ... a negotiating text and not a negotiated text." 
Explanatory Memorandum, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Official Records of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621WP.1 O/Rev .3/ Add. I (1980). 
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thorities expect that when the Conference has finally ended, the participants will 
adopt these sections in the exact form that emerged from the ninth session.227 
The following discussion is, therefore, based on the text adopted by the ninth 
session of UNCLOS.22H 
All four Gulf states have participated in UNCLOS.229 However, even if none 
of the four states actually ratify the final treaty, the text formulated by UNCLOS, 
as with the 1958 Convention, purports to codify custom.230 Thus, this treaty will 
bind the littoral states as a rule of international law. 231 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has been the 
subject of voluminous written commentaries in the past few years. 232 Based on 
the available literature, the author will limit the scope of this section to an 
analysis of Parts II and III of the Informal Text of the Draft Convention. That 
discussion will focus, in reference to passage of ships through the Strait and the 
Gulf, on an analysis of the UNCLOS Draft Convention's passage regime for 
gulfs and straits. 
227. Robertson, supra note 108, at 801 n.3, 826. Even the United States has approved the Draft 
Convention provisions that refer to "free passage through the seas ... and through narrower straits." 
U.S. to return to Sea Parley at U.N., ]\;.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1982, at A3, col. 2. 
228. UNCLOS Draft Conventon, supra note 20. 
229. Delegations to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.62/INF.12 at 14,24, 
27,41 (1980). 
230. See note 159 and accompanying text supra. 
231. Referring to the seventh session, Oxman observed that "[iJts texts are rapidly being assimilated 
into national legislation and are increasingly relied upon as guides to state practice and opinio juris". 
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session (1978),73 AM.]. 
INT'L L. I, 38 (1979). 
232. For an in-depth discussion of the Conference proceedings, see Robertson, supra note 108. See 
also Galligan, Wrapping Up the UNCLOS III "Package": At Long Last the Final Clauses, 20 VA.]. INT'L L. 347 
(1980); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conjerence on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. 
J. INT'L L. I (1980); Maduro, Passage Through International Straits: The Prospects Emergence from the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12]. MAR. 1.. & COM. 65 (1980); United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Developments at the Resumed Ninth Session - Draft Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (1980), 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 802 (1980); Yankov, 
The Law of the Sea Conference at the Crossroads, 18 VA.]. INT'L L. 31 (1977); Amerasinghe, Basic Principles 
Relating to the International Regime of the Oceans at the Caracas Session of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, 6 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 213 (1975); Gutteridge, Beyond the Three Mile Limit: Recent Developments Affecting the 
Law of the Sea, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 195 (1974); Oxman & West, IssURS to be Resolved in the Second Substantive 
Sesswn of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 14 COLUM.]. TRANSNAT'L. 87 (1975); 
Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparatwns for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. ]. INT'L L. 1 (1974); 
Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Sesswn, 69 
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1975); Conference Report, The Third United Natwns Law 
of the Sea Conference: The Caracas Session and its Aftermath, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13 (1976); and 
Conference Report, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference: The Current Status and the "Informal 
Single Negotiating Text", 8 CASE W. RES . .J. INT'L L. 33 (1976). 
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A. The Gulf of Aqaba 
Part II of the UNCLOS Draft Convention provides a basic regime for passage 
through the territorial sea.233 However, in its complexity, the Draft Convention 
also refers to bays and gulfs in Articles 10 and 122, respectively.234 
Article 10, which "relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single 
State," does not apply to the Gulf of Aqaba, which is surrounded by four 
nations. 235 Article 122, which defines a semi-enclosed sea as "a gulf ... sur-
rounded by two or more States and connected to the open seas"236 may initially 
appear to identify the Gulf of Aqaba. However, a semi-enclosed sea "must have 
an area of at least 50,000 square nautical miles and be a 'primary' sea."237 The 
Gulf, with a length of approximately 100 miles and a width of no more than 
seventeen miles at its widest point, does not satisfy this requirement.238 
Furthermore, the UNCLOS formalization of the twelve mile territorial sea 
limit239 enables Egypt and Saudi Arabia to legitimately claim, under the Draft 
Convention, the entire width of the Gulf in territorial sea. Since the high seas 
regime of the UNCLOS Draft Convention does not apply to "parts of the sea 
... included ... in the territorial sea ... of a State,"240 no parts of the Gulf, 
after twelve mile claims are made, can be governed by the high seas Articles. 
Thus, the Gulf is, most accurately, a territorial sea under the UNCLOS Draft 
Convention. 
Like the 1958 Convention, the UNCLOS Draft Convention envisions an inno-
cent passage regime for foreign ships passing through a state's territorial waters. 
233. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, part II. 
234. [d. arts. 10, 122. 
235. /d. art. 10. 
236. /d. art. 122. 
For the purposes of this Convention, 'enclosed or semi-closed sea' means a gulf, basin, or sea 
surrounded by two or more States and connected to the open seas by a narrow outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or 
more coastal States. 
[d. art. 122. 
237. Alexander, Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-enclosed Seas, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L 
L.J. 151, 155 (1974). 
238. Alexander finds that, by this definition, 25 semi-enclosed seas exist in the world, but his list does 
not include the Gulf of Aqaba. /d. at 158-59. Even if the definition were to apply, Part IX of the 
U NCLOS Draft Convention seems to provide no specific regime for semi-enclosed seas. 
239. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 3. That provisions reads: "Every State has the 
right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." [d. In response to the urgings of coastal 
nations that the territorial sea limit be formally enlarged, the United States proposed to accept a 12 mile 
limit only if passage through international straits were liberalized. See Statement of John R. Stevenson 
made in Subcommittee II of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.S. Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits, and 
Fisheries Submitted to U.N. Seaheds Committee, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 261, 262 (1971) [hereinafter cited 
as Statement of John R. Stevenson]. See also Robertson, supra note 108, at 810. 
240. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 86. 
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Articles 17241 and 18242 provide that a ship may proceed expeditiously through a 
state's territorial waters in order to reach or to leave a port. The coastal state may 
still suspend non-innocent passage in its territorial sea.243 However, the Draft 
Convention lists twelve specific criteria by which the coastal state may deem 
passage to be "prejudicial to [its] peace, good order or security," and thus 
non-innocent.244 The listing of specific criteria objectifies the concept of innocent 
passage. Thus, the UNCLOS Draft Convention, by providing specific guidelines 
by which to evaluate the innocence or non-innocence of passage, represents an 
improvement from the 1958 Convention definition of innocent passage, at least 
from the perspective of the maritime states.245 The guidelines primarily include 
acts which prejudice the defense of the coastal state or interfere with the coastal 
state's control over its natural resources.246 Concentration on characterizing 
specified activities as non-innocent, rather than on the purpose or destination of 
the ship in transit, represents a significant step in restricting the coastal state's 
241. Id. art. 17. "Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." Id. 
242. Id. art. 18. Article 18 provides: 
Id. 
I. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: 
(a) Traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) Proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. 
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and 
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are 
rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to 
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
243. !d. art 25. Article 25 provides: "The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial 
sea to prevent passage which is not innocent." Id. 
244. Id. art 19(1). "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State." Id. 
Id. 
245. See text accompanying notes 190-200 supra. 
246. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 19(2). Article 19(2) provides: 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State, if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following 
activities: 
(a) Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any other matter in violation of the principles 
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of 
the coastal State; 
(d) Any act of propoganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; 
(e) The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) The launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) The embarking or disembarking of any commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) Any act of wilful and serious pollution, contrary to this Convention; 
(i) Any fishing activities; 
(j) The carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(I) Any activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
162 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. V, No.1 
ability to prevent mantIme passage at wil1. 247 In addition, the coastal state may 
not circumvent its duties by imposing "requirements on foreign ships which have 
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage."248 
In order to balance the competing maritime and coastal state interests, Article 
21 enables the coastal state to 
adopt laws and regulations ... in respect of ... (a) The safety of 
navigation and the regulation of marine traffic; (b) The protection of 
navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) 
The protection of cables and pipelines; (d) The conservation of the 
living resources of the sea; (e) The prevention of infringement of the 
fisheries regulations of the coastal State; (f) The preservation of the 
environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hy-
drographic surveys; [and,] (h) The prevention of infringement of the 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of the coastal 
State. 249 
Article 21 safeguards the rights of the coastal state while also providing more 
objective measures to ensure that the coastal state will not deny passage arbitrar-
ily. Article 25 also provides protection to the littoral state,250 by stating that "[t]he 
coastal State may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend tem-
porarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign 
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including 
weapons exercises."251 
B. Strait of Tiran 
By the time UNCLOS was convened, passage through straits was such a critical 
concern of the major world powers that to detail a straits regime, more specific 
247. Robertson, supra note 108. at 830. Although Moore is not as emphatic as Robertson in his 
positive use of the word "objective," he nevertheless agrees that the "text makes some progress in 
defining innocent passage objectively." Moore, supra note 182, at 117. In contrast, Reisman argues that 
the text may authorize a coastal state to suspend passage on the ground that a maritime state is engaging 
in activities violative of the United Nations Charter, even if those activities do not necessarily prejudice 
the security of that coastal state. Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of 
International Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 61 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reisman]. 
Id. 
248. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 24(1). Article 24(1) provides: 
The coastal state shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the 
territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the application of 
this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted under this Convention, the coastal State 
shall not: 
(a) Impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or 
impairing the right of innocent passage; or 
(b) Discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying 
cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State. 
249. Id. art. 21. 
250. See Moore, supra note 182, at 102. 
251. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 25(3). 
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than that of the 1958 Conference, which would be acceptable to mantIme and 
strait states alike became necessary.252 The result of UNCLOS was to relegate the 
regime of straits passage to a separate part of the proposed treaty, rather than to 
treat it, as did the 1958 Convention, in one cursory Article along with the 
provisions for passage through the territorial sea.253 
252. During the 1960s, world trade increased, resulting in an increased use of straits. Grandison & 
Meyer, supra note 3, at 403 n.41. Moore argues that the formulation of a comprehensive straits 
regime is 
strongly in the interest of the entire community of nations .... Straits ... serve as routes for the 
bulk of the world's shipping trade .... Unimpeded access through straits for commercial ships 
on a global basis may be as important as preservation of military transit rights .... [T]he United 
States, Japan, the nations of the European Economic Community, and many developing 
countries are critically dependent on supplies of oil that must initially move through one or 
more straits. 
Moore,supra note 182, at 78-81. In recognition of the importance of straits passage, President Nixon, in 
his oceans'policy statement, announced that the United States would urge other nations to participate in 
the drafting of a new law of the sea treaty which would provide free transit through international straits. 
President's Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 6 Weekly Compo of Pres. Doc. 677, 678 (May 25, 
1970), cited in Robertson, supra note 108, at 806 n.21. 
253. Under customary international law, an innocent passage regime is normally associated with 
passage through the territorial sea. See notes 2 & 102 supra. The same regime applies to straits which 
are either not subject to an international agreement or which connect two parts of the open seas. See text 
accompanying notes 116-117 supra. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
attempted to articulate more specific principles for passage through straits by providing that innocent 
passage could not be suspended in straits joining either two parts of the high seas or the high seas with 
the territorial sea of another state. See text accompanying notes 211-214, 217-218 supra. However, the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea contained many problems, particularly since 
'innocence' of passage, as well as threats to the 'peace, good order, or security' of a coastal state 
could not be measured by objective criteria .... Consequently, there was nothing in the 1958 
Convention prohibiting a state from selectively restricting or denying passage on the basis of 
such criteria as character of cargo, vessel type and destination or flag. 
Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits: The "Straits Debate" Revisited, 5 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 477, 481 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pirtle]. See text accompanying notes 198-201 
supra. 
Passage through straits is vital for most nations in the world. See note 252 and accompanying text 
supra; see Grandison & Meyer, supra note 3, at 412. The Security Council has formally recognized the 
"importance of communications through critical waterways to the maintenance of peace in the Middle 
East." Grandison & Meyer, supra note 3, at 425 n.96. It has affirmed "the necessity ... [flor guarantee-
ing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area." S. C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR 
(1379th plen. mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/8247 (1967). 
With the UNCLOS extension of the territorial sea limit to 12 miles, many straits heretofore having a 
belt of high seas in the center will now be totally encompassed in territorial sea. See Pirtle, supra, at 479. 
Without a revision of the straits passage regime, these straits would thus be governed by the ambiguous 
Article 16(4) innocent passage regime of the Convention on the Territorial Sea. That result would 
prove unsatisfactory, especially since nations now recognize that the importance of straits passage merits 
separate treatment. Territorial waters 
are not usually indispensable routes for passage, as straits so frequently are, since it is possible 
to divert traffic around closed areas at the cost of some increase in the time and expense of a 
particular voyage .... [H]owever, the loss to the community from diversion around these 
closed areas of the territorial sea hardly approximates that involved in the closure of straits 
connecting high seas areas. 
McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 190-91. Many participants at UNCLOS, in recognition of the 
importance of the straits issue, argued for a new and specific legal regime. See Grandison & Meyer,supra 
note 3, at 405·06, 409-11. 
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Before UNCLOS began, the United States expressed its fear that an extension 
of the territorial sea would inhibit passage through some of the world's most vital 
waterways.254 Hence, the United States argued for freedom of navigation 
through straits as a precondition to acceptance of a treaty allowing a nine mile 
extension of the customary three mile territorial sea limit.255 
Once the substantive sessions of UNCLOS began,256 the coastal and maritime 
states expressed competing concerns in response to a freedom of navigation 
proposal. Coastal states feared that strict freedom of navigation would leave 
them little recourse to protect against pollution and threats to their national 
security.257 The U.S. position represented the concerns of the maritime states: 
An extension of the breadth of the territorial sea would allow straits states to 
interfere with the right to navigate, and "would prejudice the economic, political, 
and military interests of states that [had] relied on use of straits in the past."258 
During the 1972 meetings of the U.N. Sea-bed Committee,259 the participants 
Article 16 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea generally covers coastal competence to prevent 
non-innocent passage in the territorial sea and in internal waters. Convention on the Territorial Sea, 
supra note 19, art. 16. Part of Article 16 also covers straits passage. [d. art. 16(4). In contrast, the 
UNCLOS Draft Convention Part III, "Straits Used for International Navigation," is separate from Part 
II, "Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone." UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, parts II, III. See 
Moore, supra note IS2, at 90-94. Moore argues that the Convention on the Territorial Sea failed to 
distinguish between passage through the territorial sea and passage through straits, whereas UNCLOS 
has recognized this important distinction. [d. at 90. 
254. Cf. Robertson, supra note lOS, at SOS-09 (The United States felt that "an 'adequate agreement' 
[for straits] required an absolute right of passage through 'international' straits as defined in the 
Territorial Sea Convention."). 
255. Statement of John R. Stevenson supra, note 239, at 262. See Robertson, supra note lOS at SOS-09. 
256. See text accompanying note 222 supra. 
257. Robertson, supra note lOS, at S13; statement of Spanish representative before Subcommittee II 
of the Seabeds Committee, U.N. Doc. AI AC.13S/SC.II1SR.42 at 53 (1972) and statement of Indonesian 
representative, U.N. Doc. A/AC.13S/SC.II1SR.31 at III (1972), cited in Grandison & Meyer, supra note 
3, at 407 n.53. 
25S. Grandison & Meyer, supra note 3, at 409-10. The latter usage argument was not particularly 
relevant to passage through the Strait of Tiran before 1956. Ships did not regularly use the Strait of 
Tiran before that time "because of the threat posed by Egyptian coastal batteries at Sharm-el-Sheikh." 
Slonim, supra note 26, at 113 n.6S. After Israel withdrew from the Sinai, and the United Nations 
Emergency Force was stationed at the Strait, nations could use the Strait without fear of military 
interference, and thus with greater regularity. !d. However, even when the Strait came into normal use, 
the reliance argument had little merit with respect to the Strait of Tiran. Since the only navigable 
portion of the Strait is less than one mile from Egypt's coast on the Sinai Peninsula, an extension of the 
territorial seas to 12 miles would not affect prior users of Strait. See note 9 supra. 
259. The United Nations Sea-bed Committee was the preparatory conference for the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Lynch, The Nepal Proposal for a Common Heritage Fund: 
Panacea or Pipedream?, 10 CAL. W. INT' L.J. 25, 35 n.S3 (19S0). The U.N. General Assembly, by 
Resolution 2467, established this Committee (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the 
Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction) to study the "ways and means of promoting the 
[international] exploitation and use of the resources of" the sea-bed and ocean floor. G.A. Res. 2467 
(XXIII), 23 GAOR Supp. (No. IS), U.N. Doc. Al721S (1969). The General Assembly established an Ad 
Hoc Committee of 36 nations to engage in the study. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
16) at 14, U.N. Doc. AJ6716 (1967). For further discussion of the function of the Sea-bed Committee,see 
Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 6S AM. J. INT'L L. I, 4, S, 23 
(1974); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas 
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had modified the U.S. proposal to cover transit passage. 260 Although this Com-
mittee left the U.S. proposal essentially intact,261 the Committee replaced it with 
the British modification. The British transit passage proposal, a compromise 
between the total freedom of navigation and the innocent passage proposals, 
eventually served as the basis for the UN CLOS negotiating texts. 262 
1. The Text of the Draft Convention 
Part III of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea refers only to straits 
used for international navigation, and consists of two major sections: transit 
passage (Articles 37-44)263 and innocent passage (Article 45).264 The incorpora-
tion of the transit passage regime for ships navigating through straits represents 
a major improvement for the maritime states over the regime established by the 
1958 Convention.265 Transit passage, referred to as "freedom of navigation,"266 
is more liberal than innocent passage in several respects. First, the new regime 
contains no requirement that passage be labelled innocent by the coastal state.267 
Second, Article 44 limits the authority of strait states to suspend transit pass-
age.268 Ships passing through straits must proceed without delay and must 
refrain from threats or use of force against the coastal state.269 However, these 
Sesswn, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,3 (1975); Statements made in U.N. General Assembly Committee I by 
Senator Claiborne Pell and John R. Stevenson, 64 DEP'T ST. BULL. 150 (1971); Statement by John R. 
Stevenson made in Subcommittee II, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL. 261 (1971). 
260. Robertson, supra note 108, at 815-16. 
261. See id. at 816. 
262. United Kingdom: Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Straits, 3 UNCLOS III Off. Rec., art. 
I, U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/C.21!L. 3 (1975), cited in Robertson, supra note 108, at 819 nn. 96-97. 
263. UNCLOS Dratt Convention, supra note 20, arts. 37-44. 
264. Id. art. 45. 
265. See § III. C supra. 
266. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 38(2). "Transit passage is the exercise in 
accordance with this Part of ... freedom of navigation." /d. 
267. Cf Maduro, Passage Through International Straits: The Prospects Emerging from the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 72 (1980) (vessels are not subject to any 
criterion of innocence under the transit passage regime) [hereinafter cited as Maduro]. 
268. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 44. "States bordering straits shall not hamper 
transit passage and shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or 
over the strait of which they have knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage." Id. 
269. Id. art. 39(1). Article 39(1) provides: 
Id. 
Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall: 
(a) Proceed without delay through or over the strait; 
(b) Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence of States bordering straits, or in any other manner 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations; 
(c) Refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of 
continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or 
by distress; 
(d) Comply with other relevant provisions of this Part. 
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ships are subject to international regulations rather than an array of regulations 
that a coastal state may impose.27o 
Coastal states are protected by Article 40, which specifies that "foreign ships, 
including marine scientific research and hydrographic survey ships, may not 
carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authorization of the 
States bordering straits."271 However, in contrast to the innocent passage regime, 
the transit passage regime allows the coastal state, according to Article 42,272 to 
enact only four types of regulations: 273 
(a) The safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic 
... ; (b) The prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by 
giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the 
discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the 
strait; (c) With respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, 
including the stowage of fishing gear; (d) The taking on board or 
putting overboard of any commodity, currency or person in contra-
vention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of 
States border-ing straits. 274 
The innocent passage regime of Article 45275 applies to those straits excluded 
ii'om transit passage,276 and those straits that connect "an area of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State."277 The 
passage regime for straits governed by Article 45278 is subject to the same regime 
that governs navigation through the territorial sea.279 
2. The Draft Convention as Applied to the Strait of Tiran 
The Strait of Tiran qualifies as a strait regulable by Part III of the Draft 
Convention because the Strait is used for international navigation.280 Further-
270. Id. art. 39(2). Article 39(2) provides: "Ships in transit shall: (a) Comply with generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the International Regula-
tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea; (b) Comply with generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships." 
Id. 
271. Id. art. 40. 
272. Id. art. 42. 
273. /d. art. 42(1); Maduro, supra note 267, at 72; Moore, supra note 182, at 105. 
274. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 42(1). 
275. Id. art. 45. 
276. Id. art. 45( 1) (a). Straits excluded from transit passage are those that are "formed by an island of 
a State bordering the strait and its mainland ... [where 1 ... a high seas route or a route in an exclusive 
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics 
exists seaward of the island." Id. art. 38(1). 
277. Id. art. 45(1)(b). 
278. Id. art. 45. 
279. Id. art. 45(1). 
280. Id. Part III. The straits covered by Part III are "Straits used for international navigation." Id. See 
§ 11.B.3 supra. 
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more, the Strait of Tiran is not excluded under Article 36281 as the Strait has but 
one way through which large ships can pass. The critical issue relates to which 
section of Part II I regulates the Strait. 
The Strait of Tiran is more likely regulable by the innocent passage regime 
than by the transit passage regime.282 Since the transit passage regime applies 
where connected bodies of water are high seas,283 the main issue with respect to 
the Strait of Tiran is whether the Gulf of Aqaba qualifies as high seas under the 
Draft Convention. That the Strait of Tiran links two parts of the high seas as 
stated in Article 37,284 especially with the extension of the territorial sea limit 
under the Draft Convention,285 is questionable. As discussed in connection with 
the 1958 Convention,286 many nations characterized the Gulf as an international 
waterway, but other nations contested that characterization. Under the UN-
CLOS Draft Convention, the Gulf does not qualify as high seas.287 The Draft 
Convention provides that the high seas regime is inapplicable to any state's 
territorial seas.28B With the entire Gulf claimed under the Draft Convention as 
territorial sea,289 the Strait does not connect two parts of the high seas.290 
Under the Draft Convention, therefore, the innocent passage regime will 
apply to the Strait of Tiran, which connects an area of the high seas (Red Sea) 
with the territorial sea of a foreign state (jordan or Israel).291 Although the 
innocent passage regime under the Draft Convention affords a maritime state 
less freedom to proceed unimpeded through a strait,292 and innocent passage 
through the Strait of Tiran is non-suspendable under the Draft Convention as it 
is under the 1958 Convention,293 maritime states have, nonetheless, improved 
281. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 36. Article 36 provides: "This Part does not 
apply to a strait used for international navigation if a high seas route or a route through an exclusive 
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics 
exists through the strait." /d. See also Robertson, supra note 108, at 827-28. 
282. See Moore, supra note 182, at 111-12. 
283. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 37. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. art. 3. 
286. See § 11.B.3 & note 109 supra. 
287. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 86. Section I of Part VII (High Seas) provides 
that "this Part appl[ies] to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." /d. (emphasis added). Thus, all of the Gulf would, 
under UNCLOS, fall in the territorial sea of one of the littoral states. 
288. Id. 
289. See id. art. 3. 
290. See O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at Ill. 
291. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 45(I)(b). Article 45(l)(b) provides: "The regime 
of innocent passage, in accordance with section 3 of Part II, shall apply in straits used for international 
navigation: ... 
(b) Between an area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a 
foreign State." 
/d. See also LAPIDOTH, supra note 2, at 55. 
292. See text accompanying notes 266-70 supra. 
293. UNCLOS Draft Convention,supra note 20, art. 45(2). Article 45(2) provides: "There shall be no 
suspension of innocent passage through such straits." Id. Compare Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention, 
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their positions with respect to the 1958 Convention.294 For example, under the 
UNCLOS innocent passage regime, Israel is assured of objective criteria295 to 
evaluate passage through the territorial sea. Thus, an Arab characterization of 
passage as non-innocent would be less likely. 
V. THE EGYPTIAN-IsRAELI PEACE TREATY 
On March 26, 1979, Anwar El Sad at and Menachem Begin, after months of 
negotiation, signed the Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt296 (Peace Treaty). Although the parties' treatment of area 
waterways was not one of the major issues of discussion during the negotia-
tions,297 such treatment is nevertheless an integral part of the establishment of 
any long-lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.298 The United States has also 
affirmed the necessity of open waterways to the achievement of peace in the 
Middle East. Alfred L. Atherton Jr., in his address before the Atlanta Foreign 
Policy Conference on U.S. Interests in the Middle East expressed the U.S. 
position prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty: "Peace . . . means open 
borders, normal commerce and tourism, diplomatic relations and a range of 
official and unofficial contacts,free navigation through waterways, and an end to all 
boycotts."299 
Accordingly, Article V(2) of the Peace Treaty states that 
[t]he Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be 
international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and 
non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties 
which reads: "There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits 
which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the 
high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State." Convention on The Territorial Sea, supra note 19, art. 
16(4). 
294. Robertson, supra note 108, at 836. 
295. The regime of innocent passage for straits is governed by Part II, Section III. UNCLOS Draft 
Convention, supra note 20, art. 45(1). Section III of Part II lists specific acts by which the coastal State can 
characterize passage as non-innocent. /d. art. 19(2). 
296. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14. 
297. The discussions centered most frequently on the problem of Israel's withdrawal from the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the resolution of the Palestinian problem. For an account of the events 
leading to the signing of the Peace Treaty, and the problems the parties encountered, see generally 
Bassiouni, An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel: From Resolution 242 (1967) to the 1979 Peace 
Treaty, 12 CASE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni]; Murphy, supra note I; Reich, 
Silverburg & Stein, supra note I. 
298. Preamble, Treaty of Peace, supra note 14. The Preamble to the Peace Treaty states that the 
parties "[c]onvinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting 
peace. .. [a ]gree to the following provisions." ld. 
299. Statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. (Ambassador at Large with special responsibility for 
Middle East peace negotiations), Middle East: A Status Report on the Peace Process, BUREAU OF PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 2014, DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 43 (May 1978) (em-
phasis added). 
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will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access 
to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of 
Aqaba.30o 
169 
This provIsion is not peculiar to the Peace Treaty. Article V(2) is based on 
Security Council Resolution 242,301 which recognized the necessity "for guaran-
teeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area."302 
The language of Article V is unambiguous on its face. The combination of the 
words "international waterways,"303 "unimpeded"304 and, in particular, "non-
suspendable freedom of navigation"305 supports the conclusion that at least the 
parties will place no restrictions on the innocent passage of merchant ships 
through the Strait of Tiran and through the territorial waters claimed by Egypt 
and Israel in the Gulf.306 The language repeatedly emphasizes free navigation 
and rejects any possibility that ships moving through the area will be subject to 
various regulations that the coastal states may impose. In this sense, the parties 
clearly departed from the ambiguous regime found in the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as from the UNCLOS Draft 
Convention. The language indicates a desire by Egypt and Israel to affirm a 
passage regime that approximates the traditional freedom of navigation.307 
Should the UNCLOS Draft Convention be finalized in treaty form, a conflict 
may arise between the passage regime of the UNCLOS Draft Convention and 
that provided for in the Peace Treaty. Israel and Egypt are both participants of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 308 Because the 
notions of transit passage and innocent passage are more restrictive than the 
broader Peace Treaty Article V freedom of navigation,309 the issue of which 
treaty would prevail in the event of conflict arises. To resolve this issue, one must 
first look to the texts of the two treaties to ascertain whether any specific 
provisions, therein, resolve the possible conflict. 
Article 35 of the Draft Convention is relevant to this issue. It states that 
"[n]othing in this Part [Straits Used for International Navigation] shall affect 
300. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. V. 
301. Murphy, supra note 1, at 919. 
302. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR (l379th plen. mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/8247 (1967). 
303. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. V(2). 
304. [d. 
305. [d. 
306. See Reisman, supra note 99, at 76. 
307. As Reisman states: 
With this sort of formula, tortured, casuistic interpretations are not necessary. . The 
waterways are characterized as 'international' and any hint of a territorial competence ... is 
repeatedly excluded; there is no 'right of transit' characterizable by the coastal state, but 
instead and only the traditional freedom of navigation, and that right may not be impeded or 
suspended. 
[d. 
308. See note 229 supra. 
309. See text accompanying note 262 & § IV.B.! supra. 
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... (c) The legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in 
part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating to 
such straits."3Io This qualification is inapplicable to the regime of the Peace 
Treaty because the drafters intended the provision to refer particularly to those 
regimes established for the Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits and the Strait of 
Magellan.3ll Moreover, the Peace Treaty is not a longstanding international 
convention. 
The language of Article VI of the Peace Treaty initially appears to provide an 
answer to the question. Articles VI(2),312 VI( 4)313 and VI(5)314 expressly state 
that, subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, if the obligations of 
the parties to the Peace Treaty conflict with their obligations under another 
treaty, the obligations undertaken under the Peace Treaty will prevail. However, 
reliance on these provisions to clarify ambiguities may be misplaced. The hierar-
chy expressed in Article VI relates to the question of Egypt's present and future 
commitments to the other Arab nations, primarily Syria and Jordan.315 
An examination of the relevant portions of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties316 (Vienna Convention) may, in the absence of specific provisions in 
either the UNCLOS Draft Convention or the Peace Treaty, provide an answer to 
the question of conflicting obligations. Although the Vienna Convention has not 
yet entered into force,317 the international legal community regards the princi-
ples of that Convention to be authoritative in treaty interpretation.318 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention,319 the general conflict resolution rule for 
310. UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, art. 35. 
311. Moore, supra note 182, at 114. 
312. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. VI(2). "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their 
obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently 
of any instrument external to this Treaty." Id. 
313. Id. art. VI(4). "The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this 
Treaty." Id. 
314. Id. art. VI(5). "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented." Id. 
315. Reich, Silverburg & Stein, supra note I, at 39-41. See also Bassiouni, supra note 297, at 20. 
However, as Murphy comments, the Agreed Minutes to Article VI add further confusion by stating 
"there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties 
or agreements prevail over this Treaty." Murphy, supra note I, at 923. 
316. Convention on the Law of Treaties, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference (United Nations Publication, Sales No.: E. 70. V.5) p. 
289, cited in 2 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM. 340 n.226 (1971); U.N. Doc. NCONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter cited 
as Vienna Convention], 
317. Gamble, Multilateral Treaties: The Significance of the Name of the Instrument, lOCAL. W. INT'LLJ.I, 
8 (1980). 
318. Id. 
319. Vienna Convention, supra note 316, art. 30. "When all parties to the earlier treaty are parties 
also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 
59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later 
treaty." Id. 
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treaties relating to the same subject matter, purportedly covers this controversy. 
Article 30 provides that where two treaties apply to the same subject matter, the 
earlier treaty will apply only to the extent that its provisions are not incompatible 
with the later treaty.320 
The Peace Treaty provides for a more lenient passage regime than does the 
proposed UNCLOS Treaty. Thus, for example, a ship engaged in fishing ac-
tivities while passing through the Gulf might be allowed to proceed under the 
Peace Treaty non-suspendable freedom of navigation regime, yet be denied 
passage under the UNCLOS Draft Convention. 321 The passage provisions of the 
Peace Treaty and those of the UNCLOS Draft Convention may thus be incom-
patible if maritime activities considered prejudicial under the UNCLOS regime 
would not justify denial of passage under the Peace Treaty regime. 
A strict application of Article 30 to the provisions ofthe earlier Peace Treaty322 
would render the Peace Treaty provisions ineffective to the extent that they 
allowed greater navigational freedom through the waters than did the UNCLOS 
Draft Convention. However, strict application of Article 30 could produce the 
anomalous result of nullifying Article V(2) of the Peace Treaty. If the freedom 
of navigation regime in the Peace Treaty, implying greater rights in the parties 
to navigate through the waterways,323 were overridden by the transit passage 
and innocent passage regimes of the Draft Convention, the rights of the parties 
to the Peace Treaty would be subordinate to the more restrictive rights of the 
UNCLOS Draft Convention.324 Article V would, thus, lose its intended meaning 
of guaranteeing "unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation."325 
Through the use of an alternative construction of compatibility, one may avoid 
the unintended result that occurs where Article 30 is applied to strike the 
"incompatible" provisions of the Peace Treaty. That construction would recog-
nize "the mere fact that there [is] a difference between the provisions of a later 
treaty and those of an earlier treaty [does] not necessarily mean that there [exists] 
an incompatibility within the meaning of [Article 30] .... [M]aintenance in force 
of the provisions of the earlier treaty might be justified by circumstances or by 
the intention of the parties."326 The intention of the parties, which must be given 
320. [d. 
321. Compare Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. V(2) with UNCLOS Draft Convention, supra note 20, 
art. I9(2)(i). 
322. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
SINCLAIR]. "[I]n determining which treaty is the 'earlier' and which the 'later', the relevant date is that of 
the adoption of the text." /d. 
323. See text accompanying notes 262, 303-307 supra. 
324. See note 262 & 307 and accompanying text, supra. 
325. Treaty of Peace, supra note 14, art. V(2). 
326. Statement of Ambassador Yasseen, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties. Official 
Records. Second Session. (AiConf. 39/11 Add. 1). 9Ist meeting, quoted in SINCLAIR. supra note 322. at 67 
n.38. 
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effect in treaty interpretation, is ascertained from "their intention as expressed 
in the words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances."327 
Under that analysis, the Peace Treaty guarantee of freedom of navigation would 
remain unaffected by the UNCLOS Draft Convention. 
The Peace Treaty attempts to incorporate those guidelines which the parties 
considered essential to achievement of an overall peace between Egypt and 
Israel. A reasonable approach to the problem would recognize this goal. The 
parties' affirmation of free navigation is one of the components which will 
implement and maintain the peace. If a prime component of the peace objective 
is the agreement that the named waterways should be kept open for freedom of 
navigation, then this provision should not be overridden. The express intention 
of the parties should prevail, thus leaving the UNCLOS Draft Convention 
regime, which gives less freedom to the coastal and maritime states, in a subordi-
nate position. 
Another means to avoid the result that application of Article 30 might produce 
is through strict construction of the expression "relating to the same subject 
matter."328 Article 30 "will not cover cases where a general treaty impinges 
indirectly on the content of a particular provision of an earlier treaty."329 Thus, 
the general UNCLOS provisions relating to passage regimes for all straits and 
gulfs would not, under this analysis, affect the specific Peace Treaty passage 
regime for the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. 
Finally, if Israel or Egypt were to act in defiance of Article V of the Peace 
Treaty, on the assumption that the UNCLOS Draft Convention regime were 
superior, such an act would violate Article 18 of the Vienna Convention. Article 
18 provides that "[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty .... "330 Thus, if the regime established in Article 
V is essential for preservation of peace between Egypt and Israel, the parties 
must be bound to observe that principle over any other that may tend to distort 
the meaning of freedom of navigation. 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia have yet to affirm the principle of free navigation 
through the Gulf. Neither nation has evidenced a desire to participate in peace 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Neither is bound by the Peace Treaty, 
according to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.331 Thus, their rights and 
327. L. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIFS 365 (1961), cited in SINCLAIR, supra note 322, at 71. 
32S. SINCLAIR, supra note 322, at 6S. 
329. [d. 
330. Vienna Convention, supra note 316, art. IS. Although, as the title (Obligation not to defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force) suggests, Article IS specifically applies prior 
to a treaty's entry into force, an assumption that the principle applies equally to treaties which have 
already entered into force is fair. This assumption is especially accurate when Article IS is read in 
conjunction with Article 26, which states: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith." [d. art. 26. 
331. Vienna Convention, supra note 316, art. 34. "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State without its consent." [d. 
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duties will be governed by either the prospective UNCLOS Treaty, or the 1958 
Convention, under which Jordan and Saudi Arabia still may seek to closely 
regulate maritime traffic in their territorial waters. 
Furthermore, were Saudi Arabia and Jordan to adhere to the claim of continu-
ing belligerency with Israel, they might be justified, under internationallaw,332 
in exercising their wartime authority to prevent passage of ships through their 
territorial waters in the Gulf.333 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, the international 
community had refused to accept the argument that the Gulf was an historic or 
inland sea. Further, most major world powers agreed that a state of belligerency 
no longer legally existed between Israel and the Arab nations. Yet, the collective 
members of the United Nations, characterizing the Gulf as an international 
waterway and reaffirming a right of innocent passage through the Gulf, made 
little progress in delineating the respective rights and duties of coastal and 
maritime states under the innocent passage regime. Most nations also agreed 
that the innocent passage regime should apply as well to the Strait of Tiran, but 
were unable to agree upon the exact definition of the innocent passage regime. 
The 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, in adopting the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, attempted to balance the 
interests of the maritime and coastal states by providing a more concrete defini-
tion of innocent passage. However, even that definition was not entirely satisfac-
tory, since the Conference was unable to reach a completely objective definition 
of the innocent passage regime. Whether the adoption of the straits article 
represented new rule-making in international law is uncertain. Nevertheless, the 
Conference did continue the trend of codifying the often conflicting doctrines of 
the law of the sea. 
The Draft Convention that has emerged from the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea evidences a significant concern that a more 
precise balance between the interests of the coastal and the maritime states be 
achieved. That balance is the product of the UNCLOS participants' struggle to 
provide a more comprehensive passage regime for gulf and strait waters. The 
Draft Convention delineates more clearly the rights and duties of maritime and 
coastal states by providing specific criteria by which to regulate passage through 
territorial waters and straits. Under the UNCLOS Draft Convention passage 
regime, Israel may be more insulated from purely politically motivated imposi-
tions placed on shipping bound for or coming from Elath. The innocent passage 
regime, which is probably applicable to both the Gulf and the Strait, comes closer 
332. The UNCLOS Draft Convention does not state that its provisions apply in time of war. 
333. See § II.A.3 supra. 
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to achieving the freedom of navigation for which Israel has fought. However, 
that regime does not guarantee totally unimpeded access to the Red Sea or Gulf 
of Aqaba, since the coastal states can still regulate passage to some extent. In 
turn, the change enables the Arab nations to validly claim the twelve mile 
breadth of territorial sea, and affords those nations protection in areas of the 
Gulf which were previously not recognized in international law as legitimate 
parts of their territorial waters. At the same time, however, some dissatisfaction 
could arise from the restrictions placed on coastal state characterization of 
innocent passage. 
The fact that Egypt, Israel and other nations consider free navigation vital to 
the preservation of peace in the Middle East clearly demonstrates the necessity of 
guaranteeing all nations free and unimpeded passage through the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. This Comment has focused on the interplay of 
political and legal forces, which have often competed to reach strained and 
conflicting conclusions regarding the rights and duties of maritime and coastal 
states with respect to these waterways. A binding legal agreement between all 
four littoral nations is necessary for a satisfactory resolution of the Gulfs status, 
and the status of the Strait. Until that time, the rights and duties of the nations 
bordering the Gulf will be governed by differing regimes, and the status of the 
Gulf in particular will be defined by political, rather than legal, considerations. 
Ann Ellen Danseyar 
